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ARTICLES
PROTECTING THE UNPOPULAR FROM THE
UNREASONABLE: WARRANTLESS MONITORING
OF ATTORNEY CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS IN
FEDERAL PRISONS
Teri Dobbins'
INTRODUCTION
Less than two months after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on
New York and Washington, D.C.; Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulation
28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) was promulgated, allowing warrantless monitoring
of communications between federal inmates and their attorneys.' Under
this regulation, the Attorney General can order the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons to monitor attorney-client communications based
solely on the Attorney General's "reasonable suspicion" that a particular
inmate "may use communications with attorneys or their agents to
further or facilitate acts of terrorism."2  The rule expressly applies to
communications that fall within the attorney-client privilege Although
the new rule caused an outcry from critics who denounced it as a
violation of inmates' constitutional rights, the Attorney General defends
the rule as necessary to protect the nation from further terrorist attacks.4
' Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. B.A. Duke University, 1993;
J.D. Duke University, 1997. The author thanks Professors Peter Marguiles, Sara Sun
Beale, Robert Mosteller, Scott L. Silliman, Camille Nelson and Rodger Goldman for
comments on drafts of this Article. The author also gratefully acknowledges the research
assistance of Joshua Stegeman and Corey White.
1. The interim rule and request for comments were published at 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062
on October 31, 2001. The effective date of the rule was October 30, 2001, and the rule was
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 501.3(d).
2. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2003). The Attorney General may rely on information from
the head of a federal law enforcement or intelligence agency. Id.
3. Id.
4. "[IJt is not the intention of this Justice Department to either [sic] disrupt the
effective communication between lawyers and the accused, but it is neither our willingness
to allow individuals to continue terrorist activities or other acts which would harm the
American public by using their lawyers and those conversations to continue or extend acts
of terrorism or violence against the American people." Department of Justice Oversight:
Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism, Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 329 (2001) (statement of Attorney General John
Ashcroft) [hereinafter DOJ Hearings].
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Much of the debate has focused on inmates' Sixth Amendment right to
counsel,' and the erosion of the attorney-client privilege.6  Less
prominent in the debate is the question whether national security
requires allowing the Attorney General to monitor communications
between inmates and their counsel without first obtaining a warrant. In
the years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
government has taken numerous steps to increase national security and
prevent future attacks.7 Many Americans, desperate to regain a sense of
security, have embraced-or at least tolerated-these efforts without
pausing to consider the long-term effect on their civil liberties.
Opposition is especially muted when the government targets the rights of
suspected or convicted terrorists. However, not all possible measures
have proven to be necessary or even prudent. Consequently, in addition
to challenging the constitutionality of these measures, it has become
necessary to challenge the government's implication that citizens must be
willing to give the Executive greater authority in order to protect against
terrorism while simultaneously freeing the Executive from traditional
checks and balances that prevent any one branch of government from
exercising unfettered power.
Another question that has received relatively little attention is whether
warrantless monitoring violates inmates' rights under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution?8 Prior to enactment of
28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (monitoring regulation, or § 501.3(d)), federal and
many state prison regulations forbade monitoring of inmate-attorney
communications. 9 Consequently, the Supreme Court has not needed to
decide whether monitoring without a warrant would violate the Fourth
Amendment. Moreover, while a sound argument can be made that the
right to confidential communications with attorneys is included in the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, that right does not extend to all
persons within the scope of § 501.3(d)10 The Fourth Amendment right to
5. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
6. See, e.g., infra note 46.
7. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) (including several amendments to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801 et seq., designed to give law
enforcement officers greater authority to conduct searches and seizures).
8. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
9. See infra note 286.
10. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until after the initiation of
adversary judicial proceedings, whether by formal charge, indictment, information, or
arraignment. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167 (2001). The monitoring regulation, on the
other hand, applies to all inmates, defining "inmates" broadly to include all persons in the
custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 28 C.F.R. § 500.1(c).
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private communications with attorneys applies to all federal inmates.
Finally, reliance on the Sixth Amendment alone is troublesome because
of the conflicting precedent regarding Sixth Amendment privacy rights-
courts disagree about whether the right is violated if the accused cannot
prove that the monitoring of privieged communications prejudiced his or
her right to a fair trial. 12  The uncertainty of the scope of Sixth
Amendment privacy rights underscores the importance of exploring
Fourth Amendment protections, in addition to those provided by the
Sixth Amendment.
This Article considers whether § 501.3(d) is an unnecessary and
unconstitutional exercise of Executive authority. While national security
unquestionably is and should be one of the government's highest
priorities, the Attorney General has the ability under existing statutes
and rules, including the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, as amended (Title III),"3 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (FISA), 4 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, 5 to
monitor attorney-client communications inside of prisons. Each of these
statutes is more restrictive than § 501.3(d), but the restrictions, which
include obtaining a warrant or order issued by a neutral magistrate or
judge, are not unduly burdensome and serve the salient purpose of
ensuring that the government does not abuse its power or arbitrarily
deprive inmates of their rights. 16 This is especially important when the
right at issue is as essential as the right to confidential attorney-client
communications. Moreover, even national security concerns do not
justify allowing the Executive, acting through the Attorney General, to
bypass prior judicial review and act unilaterally in deciding when and
11. See U.S. CONST. amend IV; see infra Part IV.
12. See generally Martin R. Gardner, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Its
Underlying Values: Defining the Scope of Privacy Protection, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 397 (2000) (reviewing Supreme Court and lower court opinions,
documenting the substantial disagreement regarding the role of privacy protection under
the Sixth Amendment, and urging judicial clarification of the function of attorney-client
privacy in the right to counsel cases). Many articles and notes have been published that
have ably addressed the question of whether the regulation violates inmates' Sixth
Amendment rights. See infra note 45. This Article does not attempt to address the Sixth
Amendment in depth. Instead, it simply points out that the Sixth Amendment alone may
not provide a complete answer to the problem of protecting the confidentiality of
attorney-client communications in federal prisons. At a minimum, considering whether
the Fourth Amendment provides a right of privacy in addition to any rights under the
Sixth Amendment is prudent.
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2003).
14. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2003).
15. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
16. See supra notes 13-15.
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under what circumstances attorney-client communications should be
monitored.
In addition to being unnecessary, the rule violates inmates' Fourth
Amendment right to privacy. While inmates' Fourth Amendment rights
have been severely curtailed in many respects, their right to privacy has
not been eliminated in all contexts. When society is prepared to
recognize the right to privacy as reasonable, and exercise of the right
does not interfere with prison administration or security, then the Fourth
Amendment applies to protect inmates from unreasonable search or
seizure. Traditionally, Americans have been prepared to recognize
inmates' right to private communication with their attorneys as
reasonable. Moreover, because § 501.3(d) is unnecessary to accomplish
its stated goal of deterrence, and because there is no evidence requiring
the Attorney General to seek a warrant before monitoring inmate-
attorney communications that would jeopardize prison security or
national security, the Fourth Amendment right to privacy should apply
to inmate-attorney communications.
Finally, it is well settled that prison regulations that impinge on
inmates' constitutional rights may be upheld only if they are rationally
related to a legitimate penological objective. The monitoring regulation
does not meet this test. It serves a general law enforcement objective,
not a penological objective. Moreover, it leaves inmates without any
other means of confidential communications with their lawyers. On the
other hand, existing statutes give the government the authority to
conduct monitoring, albeit with prior judicial approval and continuing
oversight-both afford inmates a measure of protection against well-
meaning but overzealous executive authorities-without imposing any
undue burden on the government. Under these circumstances, the
regulation is unreasonable, unconstitutional, and should be struck down.
Part I of this Article describes the legislative history of 28 C.F.R. §
501.3. It briefly discusses the controversy surrounding the 1997 rule and
the October 31, 2001 amendment that added the monitoring regulation.
Part II reviews provisions of Title III, FISA, and Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41, including their requirements for obtaining a
warrant or order to intercept private communications such as attorney-
client communications. Part III addresses the claim that national security
concerns justify warrantless monitoring of inmates. It first examines the
Executive's historic use of warrantless surveillance in the name of
national security, and then reviews Supreme Court precedent holding
that domestic threats to national security do not justify exempting the
Executive from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Next, Part
III considers the Executive's more expansive power to conduct
warrantless surveillance to gather foreign intelligence and the
[Vol. 53:295
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curtailment of that power after enactment of FISA. The argument that
warrantless monitoring of inmates is necessary to protect national
security is then analyzed in light of Congress's and the Supreme Court's
rejection of the same argument outside of the prison context.
Part IV discusses inmates' constitutional rights, and in particular, their
Fourth Amendment rights. After establishing that inmates retain some
Fourth Amendment protections, this Article asserts that inmates have a
right to private communications with their attorneys that is protected by
the Fourth Amendment. Finally, Part V reviews the legal standards for
imposing restrictions on inmates' constitutional rights and applies those
standards to the monitoring regulation, concluding that the rule violates
inmates' Fourth Amendment right to privacy and must be struck down.
I. HISTORY OF 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)
Entitled "Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism," 28 C.F.R. §
501.3 was promulgated in 1997, amending the existing § 501.17 The
interim rule and request for comments were published on May 17, 1996,
and the rule was finalized and took effect on June 20, 1997.", Like the
2001 amendment, the original § 501.3 was designed to protect the public
from acts of terrorism."9 The rule allows the Bureau of Prison (BOP)
Director to authorize the warden to implement special administrative
measures upon written notice "that there is a substantial risk that a
prisoner's communications or contacts with persons could result in death
or serious bodily injury to persons, or substantial damage to property
that would entail the risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons. '
The precise measures to be implemented are left to the warden's
discretion; the regulation simply authorizes the warden to implement
"reasonably necessary" measures.2' Measures suggested in the regulation
include housing the inmate in administrative detention and limiting
certain privileges such as correspondence, visiting, interviews with the
17. 62 Fed. Reg. 33,730 (June 20, 1997) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 501). Title 28 of the
Code of Federal Regulations deals with Judicial Administration. Id. at 33,732. Section
501.3 is in Part IV Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, Subchapter A-General
Management and Administration, Part 501 -Scope of Rules.
18. Id.
19. The Supplementary Information published with the interim rule and request for
comments stated that the BOP "is adopting interim regulations on the correctional
management of inmates whose contacts with other persons present the potential for acts
of violence and terrorism. Under these interim regulations, the Warden may implement
administrative measures that are reasonably necessary to protect the public against such
acts." 61 Fed. Reg. 25,120.
20. 62 Fed. Reg. at 33,732.
21. Id.
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news media, and use of the telephone.2 The prison staff is required to
provide the affected inmate with written notification that restrictions
have been imposed and the basis for the restrictions, although the basis
for the restrictions can be limited "in the interest of prison security or
safety or to protect against acts of violence or terrorism."23
The BOP received numerous comments in response to the publication
of the interim rule. The majority of the comments concerned the First
24Amendment implications of the regulation. Indeed, the majority of the
BOP's response to the comments, published with the final rule on June
20, 1997, addressed the First Amendment issue and argued that the rule
was consistent with Supreme Court standards for restrictions on freedom
of speech and freedom of the press.2' The BOP noted that, while the
Supreme Court in Pell v. Procunier held that prison inmates retain those
First Amendment rights that are consistent with their status as inmates
and "with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system," deterrence of crime is an important function of the corrections
system and "central to all other corrections goals" is internal prison
security. 6 The BOP asserted its belief that § 501.3 is consistent with
those objectives and permissible under Supreme Court precedent.17
The BOP's response indicated that at least one comment questioned
the necessity of the rule, but was apparently based on the fact that no
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 33,730
25. Id. The BOP's published response to the comments acknowledged that:
Comments generally expressed concern that the regulation is violative of a
person's First Amendment rights, with one commenter stating that the First
Amendment "prohibits governmental interference with freedom of speech and
freedom of press."
Other commenters acknowledge that the regulation was promulgated in order to
protect the safety of government officials and the general public . ...
Notwithstanding this acknowledgment, these commenters also addressed the
First Amendment issue .... Other comments said that the regulation may
prevent the press from fully reporting on the very people who "may threaten
society the most", [sic] and that the regulation forecloses other avenues of
obtaining information; that the "complete ban suggested by the regulation * * *
is legally impermissible' [sic]; and that the regulation is imposed "without
sufficient checks and balances to challenge government action."
Id. The response acknowledged still other commenters who expressed concern that the
regulation was overbroad and indiscriminately barred the expression of speech that did
not pose a threat to Federal officials or those outside of prison. Id. At least one
commenter criticized the lack of a formal administrative measure by which non-inmates
could challenge the restrictions as applied to a particular inmate. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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such rule had existed in the past and the commenter believed that "no
death or injury ha[d] resulted" from communications between a federal
inmate and someone outside of prison.8 The BOP disagreed with the
suggestion that death or injury must occur before preventive regulations
could be implemented. 9 Despite the criticisms voiced in the comments,
the rule was implemented and remains in force.0
On October 31, 2001, the Attorney General published an interim rule
and request for comments regarding amendments to § 501.' One of the
32
amendments was the addition of § 501.3(d), the monitoring regulation.
The 1997 rule did not specifically mention attorney-client
communications, but the government acknowledged that attorney-client
communications were not subject to monitoring under the existing
regulations.33 Section 501.3(d) authorizes the Attorney General to order
the Director of the BOP to monitor or review communications between
inmates and their attorneys or their attorneys' agents if "reasonable
suspicion exists to believe that a particular inmate may use
communications with attorneys or their agents to further or facilitate acts
of terrorism. 3 4  According to the text of the rule, the purpose of
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2003). The
rule was amended in 2001, when subsection (d) was added, but the changes were not in
response to earlier criticisms; indeed, the amendments expanded the Attorney General's
authority. Id.
31. National Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg.
55,062 (Oct. 31, 2001). Although it was dubbed an interim rule, the effective date of the
rule was the day before the interim rule was published in the Federal Register. Id. No
final rule or response to comments was published in the Federal Register.
32. Id. at 55,063-64.
33. Id. The interim rule noted, "[i]n general, the Bureau's existing regulations
relating to special mail (§§ 540.18, 540.19), visits (§ 540.48), and telephone calls (§ 540.103)
contemplate that communications between an inmate and his or her attorney are not
subject to the usual rules for monitoring of inmate communications." Id.
34. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d). The rule reads:
In any case where the Attorney General specifically so orders, based on
information from the head of a federal law enforcement or intelligence agency
that reasonable suspicion exists to believe that a particular inmate may use
communications with attorneys or their agents to further or facilitate acts of
terrorism, the Director, Bureau of Prisons, shall, in addition to the special
administrative measures imposed under paragraph (a) of this section, provide
appropriate procedures for the monitoring or review of communications between
that inmate and attorneys or attorneys' agents who are traditionally covered by
the attorney-client privilege, for the purpose of deterring future acts that could
result in death or serious bodily injury to persons, or substantial damage to
property that would entail the risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons.
(1) The certification by the Attorney General under this paragraph (d) shall be
in addition to any findings or determinations relating to the need for the
2004]
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monitoring is not to gather evidence of past crimes, but to deter inmates
from committing future acts that could result in death or serious bodily
injury.35  "Inmate" is defined broadly to include "all persons in the
custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons or Bureau contract facilities."36
This category includes not only persons charged with or convicted of
criminal offenses, but also persons held as "witnesses, detainees, or
otherwise. 37 Thus, some of the persons subject to monitoring may not
even be suspected or accused of criminal activity.
The Attorney General claims that the regulation "recognize[s] the
existence of the attorney-client privilege and an inmate's right to
counsel," and that the safeguards included in the rule protect those
rights.38 Specifically, the monitoring regulation requires the Director to
employ "appropriate procedures" for reviewing the communications for
privilege claims and to ensure that "properly privileged materials" are
imposition of other special administrative measures as provided in paragraph (a)
of this section, but may be incorporated into the same document.
(2) Except in the case of prior court authorization, the Director, Bureau of
Prisons, shall provide written notice to the inmate and to the attorneys involved,
prior to the initiation of any monitoring or review under this paragraph (d). The
notice shall explain:
(i) That, notwithstanding the provisions of part 540 of this chapter or other
rules, all communications between the inmate and attorneys may be
monitored, to the extent determined to be reasonably necessary for the
purpose of deterring future acts of violence or terrorism;
(ii) That communications between the inmate and attorneys or their agents
are not protected by the attorney-client privilege if they would facilitate
criminal acts or a conspiracy to commit criminal acts, or if those
communications are not related to the seeking or providing of legal advice.
(3) The Director, Bureau of Prisons, with the approval of the Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division, shall employ appropriate procedures to
ensure that all attorney-client communications are reviewed for privilege claims
and that any properly privileged materials (including, but not limited to,
recordings of privileged communications) are not retained during the course of
the monitoring. To protect the attorney-client privilege and to ensure that the
investigation is not compromised by exposure to privileged material relating to
the investigation or to defense strategy, a privilege team shall be designated,
consisting of individuals not involved in the underlying investigation. The
monitoring shall be conducted pursuant to procedures designed to minimize the
intrusion into privileged material or conversations. Except in cases where the
person in charge of the privilege team determines that acts of violence or
terrorism are imminent, the privilege team shall not disclose any information
unless and until such disclosure has been approved by a federal judge.
35. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d).
36. § 500.1(c).
37. Id.
38. National Security, Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. at
55,064.
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not retained. Additionally, to protect the attorney-client privilege and
to avoid compromising the underlying prosecution, a "privilege team"
consisting of individuals unassociated with the underlying investigation
will be designated to ensure that privileged material is not disclosed to
the prosecution team.4 ° Unless the head of the privilege team determines
that acts of violence or terrorism are imminent, no information gathered
from monitoring may be disclosed to anyone without approval from a
federal judge.41
Finally, the government monitoring is not covert. Unless prior court
authorization has been obtained, the Director must provide written
notification to the inmate and the attorneys involved before monitoring
begins.42 While the inmate and attorney have notice of the monitoring,
the regulation does not provide any mechanism for challenging the
determination that an inmate qualifies for monitoring under the standard
set out in the regulation, nor does it provide for any judicial oversight of
the monitoring or the procedures for protecting the attorney-client
privilege.43
Many prominent legal, law enforcement, human rights, civil liberty,
and religious scholars and organizations submitted comments criticizing
the new rule, arguing that it violates inmates' First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.44 Much of the analysis in subsequent
39. § 501.3(d)(3).
40. Id. The Interim Rule reads:
In following these procedures, it is intended that the use of a taint team and the
building of a firewall will ensure that the communications which fit under the
protection of the attorney-client privilege will never be revealed to prosecutors
and investigators. Procedures such as this have been approved in matters such as
searches of law offices .... In a similar vein, screening procedures are used in
wiretap surveillance.
National Security, Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. at 55,064
(citing National City Trading Corp. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1020, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1980)
and United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1991)).
41. § 501.3(d)(3).
42. § 501.3(d)(2).
43. See generally § 501.3.
44. See, e.g., Comments from the American Bar Association submitted December 28,
2001 (on file with author); Joint comments from the American Civil Liberties Union,
American Immigration Lawyers Association, Arab American Institute, Asian American
Legal Defense Education Fund, Center for Democracy & Technology, DV Prisoners'
Legal Services Project, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Equal Justice Program,
Howard University School of Law, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, Legal Action Center, Legal Aid Society of New York,
Libertarian Party, The Multiracial Activist, National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, National Black Police Association, Unitarian Universalist Association of
Congregations, Washington Council of Lawyers, and World Organization Against
Torture, submitted December 20, 2001 (on file with author).
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comments, notes, and articles has focused on inmates' Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, implications for the attorney-client privilege, and the
chilling effect the rule may have on communications between inmates
and their attorneys. 4' Government officials defend the regulation as a
valid and constitutional exercise of Executive authority that is necessary
to ensure national security.46 However, the government's arguments in
support of the regulation only address Supreme Court precedentS 41
regarding the Sixth Amendment rights of inmates. Thus, the
presumption that the regulation is constitutional fails to consider whether
inmates' Fourth Amendment rights are violated. The government also
fails to acknowledge precedent restricting the executive's authority to
conduct warrantless searches, even in cases of threats to national
security.
4
45. See, e.g., Marjorie Cohn, The Evisceration of the Attorney-Client Privilege In the
Wake of September 11, 2001, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2003) (analyzing "the
attack on the attorney client privilege since September 11, 2001 [and] warn[ing] of the
dangers that undermining the attorney-client privilege poses to the United States criminal
justice system"); Avidan Y. Cover, A Rule Unfit for All Seasons: Monitoring Attorney-
Client Communications Violates Privilege and the Sixth Amendment, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
1233, 1234-35 (2002); Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the
Roles of Lawyers for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173, 190-91
(2003) (discussing the effect of monitoring on the attorney-client relationship); Ronald D.
Rotunda, Monitoring the Conversations of Prisoners, 13 No. 3 PROF. LAW. 1, 10 (Spring
2002) (analyzing the new regulation in light of Sixth Amendment precedent and
concluding that existing law "seems to be on the side of rejecting a per se prohibition
against monitoring in this kind of situation").
46. National Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. at
55,062-64. In comments published with the interim rule, the government cited
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977), in support of its contention that no Sixth
Amendment violation occurs when attorney-client conversations are monitored so long as
privileged communications are protected from disclosure and no information recovered
through monitoring is used by the government in a way that impairs an inmate's right to a
fair trial. National Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg.
at 55,064. The government further stated that the "rule carefully and conscientiously
balances an inmate's right to effective assistance of counsel against the government's
responsibility to thwart future acts of violence or terrorism perpetrated with the
participation or direction of federal inmates." Id.; see also Viet D. Dinh, Freedom and
Security After September 11, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 404 (2002) (describing the
new regulation as merely closing a loophole left open by prior regulations and arguing that
it adequately protects the attorney-client privilege); Administration Defends Military
Commissions, Other Antiterrorism Measures During Senate Hearing, 78 No. 46 Interpreter
Releases 1809-10 (December 3, 2001) (citing testimony of Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-
Utah) stating that the regulation is consistent with Supreme Court precedent regarding
monitoring of attorney-client communications, and citing the testimony of Assistant
Attorney General Michael Chertoff, stating that the regulation merely extended pre-
existing special administrative measures to permit the monitoring of the attorney-client
communications of a very small group of inmates).
47. See id.
48. See infra Part Ii.
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II. FEDERAL STATUTES AND RULES ALLOWING MONITORING OR
SEIZURE OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
Section 501.3(d) does not specify how to conduct the monitoring.
Presumably, communications between inmates and their attorneys could
be monitored using electronic surveillance of oral or telephone
communications, having monitors physically present listening to the
communications, or by reviewing mail to and from attorneys. It is
undisputed that except in a few limited circumstances, all of these types
of monitoring require authorities to first obtain a warrant outside of the
prison context.49 The same should hold true for monitoring inside of
prisons.
Title III is the federal statute that regulates interception of wire, oral,
and electronic communications in general, and it sets out the required
procedures when obtaining a warrant for such interceptions. 0 Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 outlines the procedure for seizing
property such as letters, books, or papers. If the target is an agent of a
foreign power,5 surveillance operates in accordance with the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act.
A. Title III
Title III "represents a comprehensive attempt by Congress to promote
more effective control of crime while protecting the privacy of individual
thought and expression."52 Much of the Act was designed to meet the
constitutional requirements for electronic surveillance enumerated by
the United States Supreme Court in Berger v. New York53 and Katz v.
United States;4 both were decided the year before Title III was enacted.5'
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2001)(requiring a court order or other written notification
for law enforcement to obtain intercepted or disclosed wire, oral, or electronic
communications from service providers); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (discussing the search and
seizure warrant requirement); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1967) (noting
federal law on official wiretap interception); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59
(1967) (discussing the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2522 (2003).
51. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2003) (defining "agent of a foreign power"). See infra Part II.C.
52. United States v. United States Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 302 (1972). Title III
regulates both law enforcement and private conduct. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,
523 (2001).
53. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
54. 380 U.S. 347 (1967).
55. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 522-23 (discussing background of Title III and citing Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
2004]
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In Berger v. New York, the Supreme Court held that New York's
wiretap statute violated the Fourth Amendment.56 The Court held that
the statute satisfied the Fourth Amendment requirement that a neutral
and detached authority issue the order, but it failed to require a
particular description of the crime committed or about to be committed,
or a specific description of the persons or things to be searched or
seized.57 Furthermore, the length of the authorization was determined to
be too long, and the statute placed no termination date on the eavesdrop
once the conversation was seized.58 Finally, the statute neither required
notice to the search or surveillance target, nor a showing of special or
exigent circumstances to avoid the notice requirement. 9 The Court
concluded, "In short, the statute's blanket grant of permission to
eavesdrop is without adequate judicial supervision or protective
procedures. ' 6"
61A few months later, the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States.
Mr. Katz was convicted of transmitting wagering information from Los
Angeles to Miami and Boston in violation of federal law.62 Evidence
used against him at trial included his end of telephone conversations that
took place in a public phone booth.63  FBI agents listened to and
recorded the conversations using listening devices they had attached to
the outside of the phone booth.64  No warrant had been obtained to
authorize the surveillance.65 The Government successfully argued to the
trial court and the court of appeals that no warrant was necessary
because there was no physical intrusion into the area occupied by Mr.
Katz.
The Supreme Court disagreed, noting:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection...
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.67
56. Berger, 388 U.S. at 62-63.
57. Id. at 54, 56.
58. Id. at 59.
59. Id. at 60.
60. Id.
61. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
62. Id. at 348.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 348, 356-57.
66. Id. at 348-49.
67. Id. at 351, 352.
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The question, then, was whether the search complied with Fourth
Amendment standards."" The government claimed that while the search
was conducted without a warrant, the search was reasonable and
conducted under circumstances in which a magistrate might properly
have issued a warrant, had one been sought.69 The Court declined to
sanction the search on that basis, emphasizing that "[s]earches conducted
without warrants have been held unlawful 'notwithstanding facts
unquestionably showing probable cause.'"7 Because the agents failed to
comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment before
conducting the surveillance, and because the surveillance led to Mr.
Katz's conviction, the judgment was reversed.7'
Congress enacted Title III the year following the Berger and Katz
decisions. It was designed to balance the needs of law enforcement with
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, outlined by the Supreme
Court in those cases. Section 2516 of the Act provides authorization to
intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications and states that the
Attorney General may authorize an application to a federal judge for an
order authorizing or approving the interception of communications by
the FBI or other federal agencies when the interception may provide
72
evidence of terrorist activities. The application must fully and
completely state the facts and circumstances justifying the applicant's
belief "that an order should be issued, 73 state the time period for which
68. Id. at 354.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 356-57 (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925)).
71. Id. at 359.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(q), (r) (2000 & Supp. 2003). The Deputy Attorney General,
Associate Attorney General, any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant
Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General or acting Deputy Assistant
Attorney General in the Criminal Division specially designated by the Attorney General
has the same authority to authorize applications for orders authorizing interception of
wire or oral communications. § 2516(a)(1). The judge may also grant orders authorizing
interception of communications that may provide evidence of numerous other offenses
under title 18, including: Presidential and Presidential staff assassination, kidnapping, and
assault (§ 1751); hostage taking (§ 1203); destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities (§ 32);
threatening or retaliating against a federal official (§ 115); congressional, Cabinet, or
Supreme Court assassinations, kidnapping, and assault (§ 351); wrecking trains (§ 1992);
production of false identification documents (§ 1028); and fraud and misuse of visas,
permits, and other documents (§ 1546)). § 2516(1)(c), (p). Likewise, orders may be issued
to obtain evidence of violations of section 274, 277, or 278 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which relate to alien smuggling. § 2516(l)(p).
73. § 2518(1)(b). The statement should include details about the offense that is being
or about to be committed, a description of the nature and location of the place where the
communication is to be intercepted, a description of the type of communications to be
intercepted, and "the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose
communications are to be intercepted." Id. It must also state whether "other investigative
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the interception will be maintained,74 and disclose facts concerning all
previous applications known to the applicant and any action taken on
such applications.75 The judge may require additional evidence to
support the application.
The judge may approve the application and issue an ex parte order
authorizing the interception if the judge determines that:7 7 (a) there is
probable cause to believe that an individual is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit one of the offenses covered by the
Act;78 (b) there is probable cause to believe that communications
concerning that offense will be obtained through the interception;79 (c)
"normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous";' (d) with limited exceptions,' probable cause exists to
believe "that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral,
or electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are
about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or
are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used" by the
surveillance target.
Title III also includes a provision authorizing warrantless surveillance
in the event of an emergency. 3  However, an application for
authorization must be made within forty-eight hours of the time an
interception has occurred or begins to occur84 The interception must
terminate immediately once the application is denied or the targeted
interception is obtained, whichever occurs first.
procedures have been tried and failed, or why [such procedures] reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed if tried or [why such procedures would] be too dangerous."
§ 2518(1)(c).
74. § 2518(1)(d).
75. § 2518(1)(e).
76. § 2518(2).
77. See § 2516(1), (2).
78. § 2518(3)(a).
79. § 2518(3)(b).
80. § 2518(3)(c).
81. See § 2518(11).
82. § 2518(3)(d).
83. § 2518(7). An emergency situation exists if it involves "(i) immediate danger of
death or serious physical injury to any person, (ii) conspiratorial activities threatening the
national security interest, or (iii) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized
crime." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. If the application is denied, or the "interception is terminated without an
order having been issued, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication
intercepted shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of [Title III]." §
2518(7)(b).
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When it was originally enacted, Title III included a provision stating
that the Act was not intended to limit the President's constitutional
power to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance or to protect national
security. 6 This provision, § 2511(3), was deleted in 1978 and § 2511 was
amended to expressly state Congress' intent that Title III be the
exclusive means for conducting electronic surveillance.87  Section 2511
now states that except as permitted under Title III, any person who
intercepts or attempts to intercept wire, oral, or electronic
communications is subject to punishment, including imposition of a fine,
imprisonment for up to five years, or both.8
Although it is agreed that Title III applies to prison monitoring in
general,89 the routine monitoring of communications with non-attorneys
has been held to fall within one or both of two exceptions to Title 111. 90
86. See § 2511 (2000) (Amendments); see also United States v. United States Dist.
Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 303 (1972) (analyzing the effect of this provision on the
President's authority to conduct warrantless searches in the name of national security).
87. See § 2511 (2000) (Amendments). Foreign intelligence surveillance, which is
governed by other federal laws, including FISA, is excepted from this statute. § 2511(f).
88. § 2511(1), (4). "Person" is defined as "any employee, or agent of the United
States or any State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership,
association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation." § 2510(6).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that
"Title III clearly applies to prison monitoring."). An argument could be made that Title
III does not apply to oral communications in prison because inmates have no justifiable
expectation of privacy in those communications. Wire communication (which include
telephone conversations) is defined in Title III to include "any aural transfer" made using
wire, cable, or other similar equipment. § 2510(1). The definition makes no reference to
the speaker's expectation of privacy. Consequently, all wire communication is subject to
Title III, regardless of the speaker's expectation of privacy. See John Ashcroft,
Memorandum for the Heads and Inspectors General of Executive Departments and
Agencies: Procedures for Lawful, Warrantless Monitoring of Verbal Communications,
May 2002 (on file with author) ("As a general rule, nonconsensual interceptions of wire
communications violate 18 U.S.C. § 2511 regardless of the communicating parties'
expectation of privacy, unless the interceptor complies with the court-authorization
procedures of Title III . . . or with the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 ...... ). Oral communication, on the other hand, "means any oral
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is
not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." § 2510(2)
(emphasis added). Thus, if no justifiable expectation of privacy exists in an oral
communication, Title III does not cover the communication. It could be argued that
inmates have no justifiable expectation of privacy in their oral communications in prison
generally, but as demonstrated below, inmates have a justifiable expectation of privacy
when communicating with their attorneys while incarcerated. Those communications,
then, are covered by Title III. See infra Part IV.C.
90. Several inmates have also challenged monitoring of non-privileged telephone
calls from prisons on Fourth Amendment grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Van Poyck,
77 F.3d 285, 291 (9th Cir. 1996); Amen, 831 F.2d at 379-80. Most courts have rejected such
challenges on the grounds that inmates have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their
calls from prison that would trigger Fourth Amendment protection, and even if the Fourth
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First, under § 2511(c), Title III is not violated if a person acting under
color of law intercepts a communication when one of the parties to the
communication has consented to the interception.9' The legislative
history confirms that Congress intended for the consent to include
express and implied consent.92 For example, apartment residents and
bank customers are deemed to impliedly consent to the use of security
devices in apartment buildings or in banks. 93 In the prison context, courts
have held that inmates impliedly consent to recording and monitoring of
telephone calls-except to attorneys-particularly when inmates are
informed before placing calls that their conversations will be monitored. 94
Courts have also held that prison monitoring falls within the law
enforcement exception to Title III. While § 2811 of the Act generally
prohibits use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept
communications, § 2510(5)(a)(ii) states that "electronic, mechanical, or
other device" does not include any device or apparatus that is being used
"by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of
his duties."95  Several circuits have held that when law enforcement
officials use devices to record or monitor all non-privleged inmate
telephone calls, this use falls within the ordinary course of their duties.96
In cases where this exception has been applied, the inmates had notice
that the calls were subject to recording or monitoring. At least one court
has required such notice for the exception to apply.97
Amendment were triggered, institutional security concerns renders such monitoring
reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 291; Amen, 831 F.2d
at 379-80.
91. § 2511(2)(c).
92. S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968).
93. Amen, 831 F.2d at 378 (quoting S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2182).
94. See Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 292 (holding that consent exception to Title III applied
when signs were posted above telephones that warned that phone calls were subject to
monitoring and taping, when the inmate signed a form consenting to monitoring, and
when the inmate received a prison manual outlining monitoring procedures); Amen, 831
F.2d at 379. See also United States v. Gangi, 57 Fed. Appx. 809, 813 (10th Cir. 2003). In
Gangi, the court held that the inmate impliedly consented to the taping of his phone calls
even though there were no signs posted above the specific phone that he used informing
him that calls would be recorded. Id. at 813. Instead, the court found that notices placed
above the phones in other areas of the prison, in which the inmate had spent significant
time, were sufficient to place him on notice that any calls he made-except calls on
specific phones to attorneys-would be recorded. Id. at 813-14.
95. § 2510(5)(a)(ii).
96. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 292; United States v. Feekes, 879 F.2d 1562, 1565-66 (7th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Paul, 614 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
941 (1980).
97. Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 2001). The court held:
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Neither of these exceptions, nor any others under Title III, have been
applied to monitoring of communications between inmates and their
attorneys. Such monitoring never has been conducted in the ordinary
course of law enforcement officers' duties and never has consent to
monitoring of attorney-client communications been implied as it has in
the case of communication with non-attorneys. 98 While nothing in Title
III expressly distinguishes between these two classes of communications,
courts and prison administrators had almost uniformly protected and
respected the confidentiality of attorney-client communications before §
501.3(d) was enacted.99 The Attorney General even acknowledged that
prior BOP regulations did not authorize monitoring of communications
with attorneys.'00
B. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41
Title III does not authorize physical searches. However, federal law
enforcement officers can obtain a warrant to seize tangible items such as
letters, books, or other papers under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41.01 The warrant may be issued for evidence of a crime (including
domestic or international terrorism), contraband, fruits of a crime, items
in possession illegally, and property intended for use or used in
102
committing a crime. The warrant must be issued by the magistrate or
state court judge if, after reviewing an affidavit or other information
from a federal law enforcement officer or attorney for the government,
probable cause exists to search for and seize any of this type of
There is some disagreement in the case law about whether "covert" monitoring
can ever be in the "ordinary course of business." Although we do not find that
the statute requires actual consent for the exception to apply, we do hold that
monitoring in the ordinary course of business requires notice to the person or
persons being monitored.
Id.
98. In most cases, prisons have specific phones for calls to attorneys and inmates are
informed that conversations on these phones will not be monitored. Consequently, it
would be difficult to construct a convincing argument that inmates have consented to
monitoring of conversations with their attorneys if they use one of these designated
phones. See, e.g., Monitoring of Inmate Telephone Calls, 28 C.F.R. § 540.102 (2002)
("Staff may not monitor an inmate's properly placed call to an attorney. The Warden
shall notify an inmate of the proper procedures to have an unmonitored telephone
conversation with an attorney.").
99. See, e.g., Small v. Superior Court, 79 Cal. App. 4th 1000, 1010 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (noting that it is "indisputable that [inmates] ha[ve] the right to effective assistance
of counsel, which includes the right to confer with counsel in absolute privacy."); 28 C.F.R.
§§ 540.18, 540.102, 543.13 (exempting telephone, mail, and oral communications with
attorneys from monitoring in federal prisons).
100. See 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062, 55,063.
101. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)(2)(A).
102. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c).
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property.10 3 The executing officer must give a copy of the warrant and a
receipt for the property seized to the person from whom it is taken, or
leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place from which the
property was taken. '04
Prior to passage of the Patriot Act, some courts approved of
magistrates issuing warrants that allowed officers to covertly inspect or
photograph, but not physically seize, property.0 5 Under these so-called
"sneak and peek" warrants, notice that the warrant had been issued and
executed could be delayed when law enforcement deemed nondisclosure
of the search to be essential to the investigation.' Covert-entry warrants
only could be issued if officers made a showing of reasonable necessity
for the delay, and the delay only could be authorized for a reasonable
time.' 7 It was unclear whether this practice was authorized under FED.
R. CRIM. P. 41.08
Section 213 of the Patriot Act clarified the authority of the courts.
Under this section, a judge or magistrate who issues a warrant, under any
law, to search for but not seize evidence of a crime, may authorize a delay
in giving the required notice that the warrant has been executed if the
court has reasonable cause to believe that immediate notification will
have an "adverse result."' 9 The warrant must provide for notice within a
reasonable time; however, the court may grant extensions for good
110
cause.
103. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(l). The judge may require an affiant to appear personally
to testify under oath. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(2)(A).
104. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2),(f)(3).
105. See United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324,1336-37 (2d Cir. 1990).
106. United States v. Heatley, No. 511 96 CR.515 (SS), 1998 WL 691201, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998) (citing United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1336-38).
107. Id. at *3. Extensions could be granted for good cause provided that each
extension was based on a fresh showing of the need for the delay. Id. at *2-3 (quoting
Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337).
108. ACLU v. United States Dep't of Justice, 265 F.2d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting
that before the Patriot Act, a court's ability to approve sneak and peek warrants was not
entirely settled).
109. USA PATRIOT Act § 213, 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) (2002). "Adverse result" is
defined as "(A) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; (B) flight from
prosecution; (C) destruction of or tampering with evidence; (D) intimidation of potential
witnesses; or (E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a
trial." § 2705(a)(2). Delayed notification is generally only allowed if the warrant prohibits
seizure of tangible property. § 3103a(b). Under § 3103a(b)(2), however, seizure may be
permitted if the court finds it a "reasonable necessity." Id.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3) (Supp. 2003). This provision of the Patriot Act has been
criticized and Rep. Otter (R-ID) has introduced a bill to amend it. See H.R. 3352, 108th
Cong. (1" Sess. 2003). The amended statute deletes the "adverse result" language and
instead would only allow delayed notice "if the court finds reasonable cause to believe that
providing immediate notification of the execution of the warrant will endanger the life or
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C. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)
FISA was enacted to resolve disagreements in the courts of appeals
regarding whether the President had inherent power to conduct
warrantless surveillance to gather foreign intelligence information in the
interest of national security."' One court noted that "FISA thus created
a 'secure framework by which the Executive Branch may conduct
legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within
the context of this Nation's commitment to privacy and individual
rights.""' 2  While the Attorney General is authorized to conduct
warrantless searches in limited circumstances,'1 3 much of the foreign
intelligence surveillance implicated by § 501.3(d) would likely require an
order under FISA."
4
physical safety of an individual, result in flight from prosecution, or result in the
destruction of or tampering with the evidence sought under the warrant. Id. Additionally,
instead of allowing delay for a "reasonable time," notice must be given within "seven
calendar days," with extensions for additional seven calendar day periods if the court finds
"reasonable cause to believe that notice of the execution of the warrant will endanger the
life or physical safety or an individual, result in flight from prosecution, or result in the
destruction of or tampering with the evidence sought under the warrant." Id.
111. ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457,460-61 (D.C. Cir. 1991). FISA did
not completely resolve this debate, and some courts, including the FISA Court of Review,
believe that the President still has inherent authority to conduct foreign intelligence
surveillance, although the scope of that authority has not been defined by the Supreme
Court. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002). FISA
has, however, significantly muted the debate.
112. ACLU Found. of S. CaL, 952 F.2d at 461 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-604 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3916).
113. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2000). The Act authorizes the President, through the
Attorney General, to conduct electronic surveillance without a warrant if the Attorney
General certifies under oath and in writing that:
(A) the electronic surveillance is solely directed at (i) the acquisition of the
contents of communications transmitted by means of communications used
exclusively between or among foreign powers,... (ii) the acquisition of technical
intelligence, other than the spoken communications of individuals, from property
or premises under the open and exclusive control of a foreign powers . . . (B)
there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of
any communication to which a United States person is a party; and (C) the
proposed minimization procedures [are in place].
Id. Accord § 1822(a)(1) (authorizing warrantless physical searches under essentially the
same circumstances).
114. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2003). If the requirements of § 1802(a)(1) or § 1822(a)(1)
are met, warrantless monitoring is expressly authorized by statute and, presumably, the
Attorney General would not need to rely upon § 501.3(d). See supra note 113.
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Federal officers are authorized to apply for an order1 5 under FISA "if
the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of
a foreign power.', 116  The FISA application must be supported by
probable cause that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or
agent of a foreign power."7 There must also be probable cause to believe
that the "places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being
used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power."" 8  Importantly, the Act does not impose a requirement of
probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is about to be
committed." 9 The application must include certifications that:
[T]he information sought [is deemed] to be foreign intelligence
information; . . . the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain
115. There is some debate regarding whether a FISA order is a "warrant"
contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 737. In the
first appeal from an order of the FISA Court, the FISA Court of Review acknowledged
that there is no definitive answer to the question of whether FISA, as amended by the
Patriot Act, meets the minimum Fourth Amendment warrant standards. Id. at 746.
However, it held FISA constitutional because surveillance authorized by the Act is
reasonable. Id. at 746 (relying on dicta and balancing test in United States v. United
States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972)).
116. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4)(A) (2000). "Foreign power" means:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized
by the United States; (2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially
composed of United States persons; (3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by
a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such
foreign government or governments; (4) a group engaged in international
terrorism or activities in preparation thereof; (5) a foreign-based political
organization, not substantially composed of United States persons; or (6) an
entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
§ 1801(a). "Agent of a foreign power" includes any person "who knowingly engages in
sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation thereof, for or on
behalf of a foreign power." § 1801(b)(2)(C). This definition includes a United States
citizen or permanent resident who "knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence
gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may
involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States." § 1801(b)(2)(A).
"United States person" means a United States citizen, "an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence... an unincorporated association a substantial number of members
of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States." § 1801(i).
117. § 1805(a)(3)(A). However, "no United States person may be considered a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected
by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Id.
118. § 1805(a)(3)(B).
119. See § 1805(a), (b). But note that to find that a United States person is an "agent
of a foreign power," there must be a finding that the person is engaged in activities that
involve or may involve criminal conduct. See § 1801(b)(2)(A).
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foreign intelligence information;'2 that such information cannot
reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques; that
designates the type of foreign intelligence information being
sought according to the categories described in [the Act]; and
including a statement of the basis for the [last two]
certification[s listed above].' 2'
The Attorney General is required to approve the application before it is
submitted to a FISA court judge,'22 who shall enter an ex parte order that
approves the application if it meets the statutory requirements.
Section 1822(b) authorizes applications for orders approving physical
searches of "the premises, property, information, or material of a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power for the purpose of collecting
foreign intelligence information.' '2 4 Applications for a physical search
order must be approved by the Attorney General and must include "the
120. One of the many ways in which the Patriot Act amended FISA was by changing
the standard for obtaining an order. Previously, courts had interpreted FISA to allow an
order to be issued only if the primary purpose of the surveillance was to obtain foreign
intelligence information. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 723-27. As amended,
gathering foreign intelligence information need only be a significant purpose of the
surveillance. Id. at 723; see also 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2002). This change has
sparked sharp criticism. Some commenters argue that this change allows surveillance to
be conducted when the primary purpose is law enforcement and not foreign intelligence
gathering. See Michael P. O'Connor & Celia Rumann, Going, Going, Gone: Sealing the
Fate of the Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1234, 1258 (2003) (characterizing
the FISA Review Court's opinion in In re Sealed Case as approving the use of FISA orders
when the government's primary purpose is law enforcement and arguing that this use of
FISA orders violates the Fourth Amendment); Heath H. Galloway, Don't Forget What
We're Fighting For: Will the Fourth Amendment Be a Casualty of the War on Terror? 59
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 921, 963-64 (2002) (examining the Fourth Amendment implications
of various provisions of the Patriot Act, including the amendments to FISA).
121. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7). The certifications may be made "by the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs or an executive branch official or officials
designated by the President from among those executive officers employed in the area of
national security or defense and appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate." Id. Furthermore, the application must contain statements of the means by
which the surveillance will be conducted; whether physical entry is required; facts
concerning all previous applications made to any judge under the Act for the same
persons, facilities or places; "the period of time for which the electronic surveillance is
required to be maintained"; and, when more than one surveillance device is to be used,
"the coverage of the devices involved and what minimization procedures apply to
information acquired by each device." § 1804(a)(8)-(11). "Minimization procedures" are
defined in the Act as specific procedures designed to minimize the acquisition, retention,
and dissemination of nonpublic information during the course of the surveillance. §§
1801(h), 1805(a)(4).
122. § 1805(a)(1). The FISA court consists of eleven district court judges from seven
of the United States judicial circuits, designated by the United States Supreme Court
Chief Justice. § 1803(a) (2003).
123. § 1805(a).
124. § 1822(b).
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identity . . . or a description of the target of the search, and a detailed
description of the premises or property to be searched and of the
information, material or property to be seized, reproduced, or altered.
1 25
Applications must also include a statement of the facts relied upon to
justify the search, including the belief that the target is a "foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power," and that foreign intelligence information
is on the property to be searched.1 6 There also must be a "statement of
the nature of the foreign intelligence sought," how the search will be
conducted, "and a statement of minimization procedures." '27
The judge shall enter an ex parte order approving the physical search if
the judge finds that the application was authorized by the President,
submitted by a federal officer, approved by the Attorney General, and
included the appropriate minimization procedures and all of the required
statements and certifications. 28 The judge must also find probable cause
to believe that the target of the search is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power, and that the premises or property to be searched is owned
or used, possessed by, or is in transit to or from a foreign power or its
agent. 129 Probable cause may be based, in part, on the past activities of
the target "as well as facts and circumstances relating to current or future
activities of the target."'3 ° Section 1824(e) allows warrantless searches in
an emergency, but an application must be filed within seventy-two hours
of the Attorney General's authorization.
D. Obtaining Warrants to Monitor Inmate-Attorney Communications
under Title III, FISA, and FED. R. CRIM. P. 41
If the Attorney General believes that an inmate is using or intends to
use communications with his or her attorneys to facilitate acts of
terrorism, a warrant or order may be obtained and surveillance initiated
125. § 1823(a)(3). The application must also include "(1) the identity of the Federal
officer making the application; [and] (2) the authority conferred on the Attorney General
by the President and approval of the Attorney General to make the application."
§ 1823(a)(1), (2).
126. § 1823(a)(4).
127. § 1823(a)(5), (6). Additionally, a qualified executive official must certify that: (1)
the information sought is foreign intelligence information, (2) "a significant purpose of the
search is to obtain foreign intelligence information," and (3) the information "cannot
reasonably be obtained using normal investigative techniques." § 1823(a)(7) (2003). The
certification must also designate the type of information sought. Id.
128. § 1824(a).
129. § 1824(a)(3). The statute provides that "[n]o United States person may be
considered an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the
[F]irst [A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States." Id.
130. § 1824(b).
131. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1), 2518(3)(a) (2000).
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under Title III, FED. R. CRIM. P. 41, or FISA, depending on whether the
threat is from a domestic source or an agent of a foreign power, and
depending on the anticipated type of monitoring.
In the case of domestic threats, the Attorney General may seek a
warrant under Title III to conduct electronic surveillance by presenting
the required application to a magistrate. '32 This is undoubtedly more
burdensome than initiating monitoring under § 501.3(d), because Title
III requires prior judicial approval and the probable cause standard in
the statute is higher than the reasonable suspicion standard in the
regulation. However, in light of the government's vast experience in
seeking such warrants and the small number of inmates and warrants at
issue, the burden is not unreasonable. 3' Moreover, requiring judicial
approval has the benefit of providing a check on the power of the
executive branch.
The government may obtain a warrant under FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 to
seize written communications. 134 If reasonable cause is shown, the
government may even obtain a "sneak and peek" warrant to covertly
review or photograph the communications while delaying notification of
the warrant's execution.1 5  A warrant under Rule 41 also requires
probable cause, but if probable cause is shown, the judge or magistrate
has no discretion to refuse to issue the warrant.1
36
A FISA warrant imposes a different burden on the Attorney General.
If the threat is from a foreign power, then the Attorney General may
apply to a FISA court judge for an electronic surveillance or physical
search order. 137 If the judge finds probable cause to believe that the
inmate is an agent of a foreign power, the government is not required
separately to prove that a crime has been or is about to be committed.
As with Title III warrants, prior judicial approval is required but is not
unduly burdensome, and is consistent with our constitutional system of
checks and balances. 39
Once a warrant or order is obtained, the government may monitor
communications between the inmate and his or her attorneys, either
132. 50 U.S.C. § 1824(e) (2003).
133. DOJ Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft
during Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings that as of December 6, 2001 only 16 inmates
met the standard for monitoring).
134. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)(2)(A).
135. See United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1336-37 (2d Cir. 1990).
136. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d) (stating that the judge or magistrate must issue the
warrant if there is probable cause under paragraph (c)) (emphasis added).
137. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (2000).
138. See § 1805(a)(3), (4).
139. See § 1805(a).
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covertly or after informing the inmate of the surveillance. Measures
must still be taken to protect the attorney-client privilege, and the
Attorney General may use routine screening procedures for searching
and seizing attorney-client communications pursuant to warrants. 140 In
light of these congressionally approved methods of conducting
surveillance, no justification exists for the BOP monitoring regulation.
11. NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Undoubtedly, warrantless monitoring as outlined in 28 C.F.R. §
501.3(d) is unconstitutional outside of the prison context. 14' The use of
electronic devices to intercept attorney-client communications implicates
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, and courts have
discussed extensively the government's duty to comply with the Fourth
Amendment in the face of threats to national security,14 although they
have not defined the scope of the Executive's authority when faced with
national security threats inside federal prisons. However, applying the
reasoning from the decided cases, the Attorney General's assertion that
warrantless monitoring is necessary to protect national security is
unfounded.
A. Historic Overview of Executive Authority and the Warrant
Requirement in Matters of National Security
Article II of the United States Constitution charges the President with
the duty to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States.''143 This includes the authority to protect the government against
unlawful overthrow or subversion. 44  In the nation's early days,
presidents exercised this authority by personally assuming responsibility
for intelligence matters. Although Congress began enacting legislation
140. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 556-57, 568 (1989) (approving the use of
in camera review to determine whether allegedly privileged attorney-client
communications fall within the crime-fraud exception, but only after the party opposing
the privilege presents evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the in camera
review will yield evidence that the crime-fraud exception applies); United States v.
Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 42-43 (D. Conn. 2002) (addressing proper
procedures to protect privileged communications when a search involves property of an
attorney, and citing U.S. Department of Justice's Guidelines for searches of the premises
of attorneys).
141. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000); United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith),
407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967); supra Part II.
142. E.g., United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1124 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Berger,
the court held "[t]he interception of an oral conversation falls within the [F]ourth
[A]mendment's protections .... and capturing a conversation through the use of electronic
devices is a 'search and seizure"').
143. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
144. Keith, 407 U.S. at 310.
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and taking a more active role in intelligence in the twentieth century,
presidents continued to authorize surveillance-particularly electronic
surveillance-in national security matters, without prior judicial
approval. 4 1 Presidents claimed such authority for decades until the
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied to electronic
surveillance, thereby raising the question of the constitutionality of such
warrantless surveillance.1
46
B. The Fourth Amendment Applies in the Face of Domestic Threats
The Supreme Court ruled more than thirty years ago that the
President, acting through the Attorney General, is not exempt from the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, even in cases involving threats
to national security from domestic organizations. 47 In United States v.
United States District Court (Keith), three defendants were charged with
conspiracy to destroy government property, and one of those defendants
was charged with bombing a Central Intelligence Agency office in Ann
Arbor, Michigan. 4 8  The Government admitted that the Attorney
General had approved wiretaps "to gather intelligence information
deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic
organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the
Government.' 49 The surveillance was conducted without prior judicial
approval. During the surveillance, agents overheard a conversation
involving the defendant charged with the bombing."'
The government argued that the warrantless surveillance was a
reasonable exercise of the President's inherent power to protect national
security, and that Title III exempted national security surveillances from•152
the Act's warrant requirement. In an opinion authored by Justice
145. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 299; William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive
Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 48 (2000).
146. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 145 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
358 (1967)).
147. Keith, 407 U.S. at 320.
148. Id. at 299.
149. Id. at 300 (quoting the Attorney General's affidavit).
150. Id. at 301.
151. Id. at 300-01.
152. Id. at 303. The government relied on 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) of Title III, which
stated:
Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the nation
against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to
obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the
United States, or to protect national security information against foreign
intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to
limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems
20041
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Powell, the Supreme Court held that Title III did not confer any such
power, but merely provided that the Act should "not be interpreted to
limit or disturb such power as the President may have under the
Constitution. ''5 3  Consequently, any Executive authority to conduct
warrantless searches in cases involving national security must be
grounded in the President's constitutional powers.
14
The Court was careful to note that it was not passing judgment on the
President's power to conduct warrantless surveillance of foreign powers,
or to obtain foreign intelligence.155 According to the Attorney General,
the surveillance in Keith was necessary to protect the nation from attack
by domestic organizations. There was no evidence of any involvement of
a foreign power. 116 Thus, the Court's sole concern was the President's
alleged exemption from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in
the face of threats from domestic organizations."'
The Court acknowledged the President's duty to protect the
government from unlawful overthrow and the necessity of using
electronic surveillance to gather intelligence regarding potentialS 158
threats. However, the Court recognized that this need had to be
weighed against the potential for abuse:159
If the legitimate need of Government to safeguard domestic
security requires the use of electronic surveillance, the question
is whether the needs of citizens for privacy and free expression
may not be better protected by requiring a warrant before such
necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government
by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger
to the structure or existence of the Government.
Id. at 302. Section 2511(3) was deleted in 1978 when the Act was amended and FISA was
enacted. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783;
see also Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1202 n.66 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
153. Keith, 407 U.S. at 303. The Court noted that the language and legislative history
of § 2511(3) refuted the government's interpretation. Id. The Court concluded, "We
therefore think the conclusion inescapable that Congress only intended to make clear that
the Act simply did not legislate with respect to national security surveillances." Id. at 306.
154. Id. at 308. The Court articulated the question as "[w]hether safeguards other
than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a
situation involving the national security . I..." d. at 309 (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967)).
155. Id. at 308.
156. Id. at 309 (quoting the Attorney General's affidavit).
157. Id. The Court noted that it often may be difficult to distinguish between domestic
and foreign threats against the Government of the United States, but had no such
difficulty in that case. Id. at 309 n.8.
158. Id. at 310. The Court said, "[i]t would be contrary to the public interest for the
Government to deny to itself the prudent and lawful employment of those very techniques
which are employed against the Government and its law-abiding citizens." Id. at 312.
159. See id. at 314-15.
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surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask whether a warrant
requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts of Government
to protect itself from acts of subversion and overthrow directed
against it.'6'
The Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment warrant clause was
neither dead language, nor "an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed'
against the claims of police efficiency."'' 6' On the contrary, the warrant
clause-with its requirements of probable cause and issuance by a
neutral, disinterested magistrate-is a necessary safeguard against well-
meaning but overly zealous executive officers.
The Court further stated that "[t]hese Fourth Amendment freedoms
cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be
conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch.'
6 3
Executive officers are charged with the duty to enforce the laws, to
investigate, and to prosecute.16 As such, they cannot serve as neutral or
disinterested judges of their own enforcement, investigative, or
prosecutorial efforts. 16  Nor is post-surveillance judicial review an
acceptable check on executive discretion.16 Instead, the Court favored
prior review as the "time-tested" and appropriate means of assuring
compliance with the Fourth Amendment. 67 The Court also rejected the
argument that obtaining a warrant would be unduly burdensome.
68
Finally, the Court was not swayed by arguments that a warrant is not
required when criminal prosecution is the objective of the surveillance. 69
The government contended that the surveillance at issue in that case was
conducted for the primary purpose of gathering intelligence about
subversive forces and not for gathering evidence for a specific
prosecution, and it claimed that the traditional warrant requirement
should not apply in those circumstances. 70 The Court disagreed, noting
that government surveillance risks infringement of constitutionally
160. Id. at 315.
161. Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 316-17.
164. Id. at 317.
165. Id. The Court noted, "The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment
accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to
obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected
speech." Id.
166. Id. Indeed, the court noted that no such review would ever take place if the
government declined to prosecute. Id. at 318.
167. Id. at 318.
168. Id. at 318-21.
169. Id. at 318-20.
170. Id. at 318-19.
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
protected privacy, regardless of its purpose.171 "We recognize, as we have
before, the constitutional basis of the President's domestic security role,
but we think it must be exercised in a manner compatible with the Fourth
Amendment. In this case we hold that this requires an appropriate prior
warrant procedure."'72
The Court acknowledged that domestic security surveillance might
involve different practical and policy considerations than those involved
in surveillance of "ordinary crime" and invited Congress to set standards
appropriate for issuing warrants in cases of threats to domestic security.
173
The Court noted that standards different from those set out in Title III:
may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are
reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of
Government for intelligence information and the protected
rights of our citizens. For the warrant application may vary
according to the governmental interest to be enforced and the
nature of citizen rights deserving protection. 1
74
C. FISA Applies in the Face of Threats to National Security from Agents
of Foreign Powers
In Keith, the Court expressly declined to decide whether the President
had inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless electronic
surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information in the interest of
national security.' The courts of appeals were divided on the answer to
that question. The Third and Fifth Circuits sustained the President's
power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance for the primary
purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information,76 but the D.C.
Circuit held that a cause of action was stated under the Fourth
Amendment for damages resulting from warrantless surveillance, even
171. Id. at 320. The Court further noted the especially sensitive nature of security
surveillances, citing the "inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the
necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the temptation to
utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent." Id.
172. Id. at 320. In its opinion, the Court acknowledged that there have been a few,
carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. at 318. However, those
exceptions were recognized in cases in which there is a need for law enforcement officers
to protect their own well-being and preserve evidence from destruction. Id. Even when
the Court has recognized those exceptions, it has consistently reaffirmed the principle that
police must obtain a warrant whenever practicable. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20 (1968); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969)).
173. Id. at 322.
174. Id. at 322-23.
175. Id. at 308.
176. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418,426 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 960 (1974).
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though the Attorney General had approved the surveillance for the
purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information. 177 Soon after Keith
was decided, Congress resolved this conflict by enacting FISA, which
includes standards for foreign intelligence surveillance orders that vary
from the warrant standards in Title II. 7" Congress, through its
enactment of FISA, "sought to resolve doubts about the constitutionality
of warrantless, foreign security surveillance and yet protect the interests
of the United States in obtaining vital intelligence about foreign
powers.' ' 79 FISA allows electronic surveillance of foreign agents without
the necessity of establishing probable cause that a crime has been or will
be committed. 8 Thus, Congress apparently concluded that the inquiry
for determining the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth
Amendment depends on whether foreign agents are targets.'
8
'
Notably, some courts, including the FISA Court of Review, continue
to assume that the President has inherent authority to conduct
warrantless searches for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence."2
The Supreme Court has not ruled on this precise question, but its
177. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 607, 659, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
178. Compare the Title III warrant standards, 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000), with
requirements for FISA order, 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2000).
179. ACLU Found. of S. Cal. V. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
180. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a).
181. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 738 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (noting
the different standards for obtaining a warrant under Title III and FISA). The court
stated:
Congress clearly intended a lesser showing of probable cause for these activities
than that applicable to ordinary criminal cases .... And with good reason-
these activities present the type of threats contemplated by the Supreme Court in
Keith when it recognized that the focus of security surveillance "may be less
precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime" even in the
area of domestic threats to national security.
Id. This approach follows the Supreme Court's language in Keith suggesting that
standards for national security surveillance warrants might differ from those in Title III.
United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 401 U.S. 297, 322 (1972).
182. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742. The FISA Court of Review noted that courts
that have decided the issue have held that the President has inherent authority to conduct
warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence information (although all of the cases
cited were decided before FISA was enacted). Id. "We take for granted that the
President does have that authority and, assuming that is so, FISA could not encroach on
the President's constitutional power." Id. See generally William F. Brown & Americo R.
Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical Searches for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Executive
Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 97 (1985) (examining
constitutional justification for presidential authority to conduct warrantless searches for
foreign intelligence purposes); David S. Eggert, Executive Order 12,333: An Assessment of
the Validity of Warrantless National Security Searches, 1983 DUKE L.J. 611, 634-35 (1983)
(arguing that whatever authority the President has to conduct foreign intelligence
surveillance, the surveillance must comply with the Fourth Amendment).
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reasoning in Keith, along with the enactment of FISA and Congress's
statement in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(f) that the procedures in Title III and
FISA "shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance...
and the interception of wire and oral communications may be
conducted," strongly indicate that the President's inherent authority to
conduct warrantless searches is very narrow, if it exists at all.' 83 In any
event, § 501.3(d) clearly authorizes warrantless searches and seizures that
are not conducted for purposes other than the obtaining of foreign
intelligence. Consequently, those searches and seizures do not fall within
whatever inherent authority the President may have.
D. The Regulation is not a Valid Exercise of the President's Authority as
Commander in Chief
The Executive's authority as Commander in Chief does not justify the
abrogation of rights permitted by the regulation. While the courts have
been extremely deferential to the Executive when addressing
confinement and trial of suspected terrorists, 84 the deference is not
unlimited. In the current "war on terrorism," the courts have been most
deferential to the President in his capacity as Commander in Chief.
8 5
Courts appear particularly reluctant to question the President's judgment
with respect to the detention of enemy combatants during a time of
war.' However, § 501.3(d) would apply in times of peace to inmates
who have never taken up arms against America and who have not been
designated as enemy combatants. Under these circumstances, the same
degree of deference to the Executive is unwarranted.
183. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 145 (discussing the remaining constitutional
issue regarding the Executive's authority to conduct warrantless searches in light of the
amended language of Title III). The Second Circuit recently expounded upon the limits of
the President's inherent authority in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003)
(Padilla IV). See infra, Part III.D. The court noted that when the President acts in a
manner contrary to congressionally enacted legislation, the President's authority is at its
"lowest ebb." Padilla, 352 F.3d at 711 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)). The court qualified the decision by stating
that "Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control [in this situation] only by disabling
the Congress from acting upon the subject." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38.
184. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that in the area of
foreign relations and national security, courts give considerable deference to the political
branches).
185. See, e.g., id; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hamdi II);
Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
186. See Padilla, 233 F.3d at 588-89. The court noted that no formal declaration of war
is necessary for the President to use his power as Commander in Chief. Id. at 588-90; see
also Hamdi 11, 316 F.3d at 466.
187. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2002).
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Judicial deference is due largely to the Constitution's allocation of
powers. '8 Article II, section 2 declares that the President shall be the
Commander in Chief of the armed forces, and empowers the President to
detain persons captured during armed conflicts, to deport or detain alien
enemies during hostilities, and to confiscate and destroy enemy
property.' " The Court has held that "[t]he constitutional allocation of
war powers affords the President extraordinarily broad authority as
Commander in Chief and compels courts to assume a deferential posture
in reviewing exercises of this authority."' " ' Recently, several courts
exercised such deference when individuals designated by the President as
"enemy combatants" challenged the legality and conditions of their
detention.'9'
The Fourth Circuit vacated a district court order directing the United
States to allow a public defender to have unmonitored access to Yaser
Esam Hamdi, an American citizen.' 9 The United States had objected to
the district court order and asserted that because Hamdi had been
declared an "enemy combatant," he had "no general right under the laws
and customs of war, or the Constitution . . . to meet with counsel
concerning [his] detention, much less .. .without military authorities
present."' 93 The Fourth Circuit criticized the district court for failing to
give proper weight to national security concerns and the effect of
Hamdi's unmonitored access to counsel on the government's ongoing
intelligence efforts.
19 4
The Second Circuit examined the limits of the President's inherent
authority in Padilla v. Rumsfeld. '9' In Padilla, the government argued
that as Commander-in-Chief, "the President has the inherent authority
188. Hamdi 11, 316 F.3d at 474.
189. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also Hamdi I1, 316 F.3d at 463.
190. Hamdi 11, 316 F.3d at 474.
191. Id.; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 606.
192. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278,282-83 (4th Cir. 2002) (Hamdi I).
193. Id. at 282.
194. Id. The order was reversed and remanded for further proceedings "[b]ecause the
district court appointed counsel and ordered access to the detainee without adequately
considering the implications of its actions and before allowing the United States even to
respond." Id. at 284. This issue was not raised in Hamdi I. See Hamdi I, 316 F.3d at 466
n.4. Thus, the Fourth Circuit has not had to decide whether enemy combatants can be
held without access to counsel. The United States Supreme Court granted Hamdi's
petition for writ of certiorari challenging the Fourth Circuit's judgements. 124 S. Ct. 981
(2004). The Department of Defense subsequently announced that Hamdi would be
granted access to a lawyer but reiterated their belief that the decision was discretionary
and not legally required. P. Jess Bravin, White House to Allow Counsel For U.S.-Born
Taliban Detainee, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2003, at A5.
195. 352 F.3d 695, 699 (2d Cir. 2003) (Padilla IV).
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to detain those who take up arms against this country."'' 96 In response,
Padilla, an American citizen, contended that the President's actions were
in conflict with the Non-Detention Act, which prohibits detention of
American citizens absent express congressional authorization. 97 By
designating Padilla an enemy combatant and detaining him without
congressional authorization, the President impermissibly "engaged in the
'lawmaking' function entrusted by the Constitution to Congress in
violation of the separation of powers.
' '198
The court agreed that the order to detain Padilla as an enemy
combatant was legislative in nature and consequently outside of the
President's authority as Commander-in-Chief. The court cited the
Offenses Clause, the Suspension Clause, and the Third Amendment as
examples of the Constitution's explicit grant of power to Congress to
make laws affecting individual liberties in times of war. 199 Noting that
the Framers understood that individual liberties may be abridged in
times of national crisis, the court concluded: "the inherent emergency
powers necessary to effect such abridgements" rest with Congress, not
the President.2°° Thus, "while Congress-otherwise acting consistently
with the Constitution-may have the power to authorize the detention of
United States citizens under the circumstances of Padilla's case, the
President, acting alone, does not.,
20 1
These two cases demonstrate the deference given to the President with
respect to detention of suspected terrorists and the limits of that
deference.2 2 It is Congress's role to enact legislation affecting individual
liberties domestically, even in times of war. Section 501.3(d), enacted
without congressional approval and contrary to the provisions of Title
III, FISA, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, affects the
individual liberties of federal inmates arrested and imprisoned
domestically.2 3 In these circumstances, the President cannot rely on his
authority as Commander-in-Chief to deprive inmates of their
constitutional rights.
196. Id. at 712 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2).
197. Id. at 713.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 715.
200. Id. at 714 (citing Youngstown Sheet Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 649-50
(Jackson, J., concurring)). Padilla argued that Congress has never defined the term
"enemy combatant," or stated when that term applies, and claimed: "The President's
order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by
Congress-it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the
president." Id. at 714 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588).
201. Id. at 715.
202. See id.; Hamdi H, 316 F.3d at 474.
203. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.2(d) (2002).
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E. National Security and Warrants (or Not) Inside of Prisons
The Supreme Court considered and rejected the argument that the
President is exempt from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
when faced with domestic threats to national security.24 In reaching this
decision, the Supreme Court carefully considered the potential impact on
national security and the burden that the warrant requirement places on
the Executive. 9  Ultimately, the Court concluded that even pressing
national security concerns do not justify a complete exemption from the
requirement of prior judicial approval.°6  Consequently, absent
exceptional circumstances,07 federal law enforcement officials cannot
monitor the communications between a suspected domestic terrorist and
his or her attorney outside of the prison context without a warrant.
Yet, the Attorney General argues that national security demands that
he have the authority to monitor that same suspect without a warrant
once that suspect is arrested and becomes a federal inmate. In support of
this argument, the Attorney General cites an al Qaeda training manual
that advises imprisoned members to hide messages to communicate and
208exchange information with members outside of prison. In light of this
evidence that certain imprisoned terrorists may intend to further their
unlawful aims using any means of communication possible-even by
passing hidden messages through an unwitting attorney-the Attorney
General claims that the new rule is a necessary measure to prevent future
terrorist attacks. 9
This argument is logically flawed. A suspected terrorist outside of
prison has the ability to contact co-conspirators directly and freely. If the
Attorney General suspects that an individual who is not an inmate is
planning a terrorist attack, no surveillance could take place without prior
court authorization.20 After carefully considering this issue, both
Congress (by enacting FISA) and the Supreme Court (in Keith)
concluded that national security can be protected even if the Executive is
required to obtain a warrant before conducting surveillance.' No
reason has been articulated for the proposition that inmates-whose only
potential link to their network of terror is through their attorneys-
204. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith) 407 U.S. 297, 320-21 (1972).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 321.
207. See id. at 318.
208. DOJ Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft).
209. See id.
210. Except, of course, in case of emergency circumstances as defined in case law or
statutes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (2000).
211. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f); United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407
U.S. 321 (1972).
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would pose a greater risk to national security than suspected terrorists
outside of federal prisons.
Nor is there any evidence that requiring the Attorney General to
obtain a warrant before monitoring attorney-client communications
would constitute an undue burden, particularly in light of testimony that
only a handful of inmates are currently subject to monitoring.
Requiring a warrant will only prevent monitoring in those circumstances
in which the Attorney General is unable to convince a neutral and
detached magistrate that probable cause exists to believe that the inmate
will use his or her communications with the attorney to further acts of
terrorism.213  But this is precisely the point of prior judicial review:
preventing the Executive from exercising sole discretion in conducting
214
searches. '4 The magistrate or judge represents the judicial check on the
power of the Executive Branch; and in the end "[a]lthough some added
burden will be imposed upon the Attorney General, this inconvenience is
justified in a free society to protect constitutional values. ' '1 '
Finally, existing rules and statutes give the Attorney General more
flexibility with respect to disclosure of monitoring. While § 501.3(d)
requires advance notice of monitoring, warrants can be obtained ex parte
216
under Title III, FED. R. CRIM. P. 41, and FISA. Nothing prevents the
Attorney General from disclosing the surveillance if doing so better suits
his purposes, but disclosure remains purely discretionary. Knowing that
they might be subject to covert surveillance at any time-with or without
notice to the inmate-arguably furthers the goal of deterrence more
effectively than surveillance that alerts the inmate of the need to speak in
code or hide messages to evade detection by the monitors.
While it is convenient to be able to monitor attorney-client
communications of inmates without having to seek prior judicial
approval, convenience is different from necessity. National security can
be adequately protected by compliance with Title III, FED. R. CRIM. P.
41, or FISA, while preserving a vital check on the authority of the
212. See DOJ Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft)
(stating that regulation only applied to sixteen people as of December 6, 2001).
213. The burden of proof would be higher as well, because under Title III the
magistrate must find probable cause to believe that a crime has been, is being, or is about
to be committed, while under 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2002), the Attorney General must only
have a "reasonable suspicion ... that a particular inmate may use communications with
attorneys or their agents to further or facilitate acts of terrorism." § 501.3(d). However,
the Attorney General has articulated no reason why the lower standard is necessary to
protect national security.
214. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 316-17.
215. See id. at 321 (commenting on the holding that the government's concerns did not
justify deviation from the Fourth Amendment requirement of prior judicial approval).
216. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1).
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executive branch and the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship.
Vesting unchecked authority in one branch of government-indeed in
one individual: the Attorney General-is not only antithetical to our
system of checks and balances, but it sets the stage for abuses of
authority by "well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive
officers."2 '7  This danger becomes especially acute with § 501.3(d)
because the initial decision to initiate monitoring is not subject to judicial
218
review. One cannot challenge the Attorney General's conclusion that
a particular inmate is unlikely to use communications with his or her
attorney to facilitate acts of terrorism. Nor can one challenge the
privilege team's conclusions with respect to which communications fall
outside of the attorney-client privilege, and therefore can be retained by
the government, without notice to the inmate or attorney.3 9 With respect
to Section 501.3(d), such authority is both unnecessary and unwise.
IV. INMATES' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The Supreme Court has noted that "[p]rison walls do not form a
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the
217. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) (quoting Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921)).
218. See § 501.3(d). The inmate and attorney have the option of filing a lawsuit to
challenge the legality of the regulation itself, but that is a very time-consuming and
circuitous route that is not likely to prevent monitoring in the meantime. See § 501.3(e).
219. The regulation merely requires judicial approval before the information can be
"disclose[d]" by the privilege team. § 501.3(d)(3). This does not prevent a member of the
privilege team from indirectly using the information in other investigations. Furthermore,
a significant risk exists that the privilege team will be unable to determine whether
particular communications are privileged because the targeted inmates will likely be
suspected of using codes or hidden messages to conceal a criminal purpose which could
invoke the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.
220. Abuse by BOP or DOJ officers may be the exception to the rule, but such abuses
do occur. Section 1001 of the Patriot Act directs the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG), U.S. Department of Justice to provide semiannual reports to Congress on claims of
civil rights and civil liberties abuses by DOJ employees. Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1001, 115 Stat. 272, 391 (Oct. 26,
2001). In its July 17, 2003 report, the OIG received 1,073 complaints of Patriot Act-
related civil rights or civil liberties abuses. U.S. Department of Justice Office of the
Inspector General, Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA
PATRIOT Act, July 17, 2003 at 6. Of those, 272 were within the OIG's jurisdiction, and
of the 272, thirty-four stated credible Patriot Act complaints. Id. While thirty-four may
not seem like a large number, those complaints cover only a six month period of time
(from December 16, 2002 through June 15, 2003). See id. While some complaints may
prove unfounded, others will yield proof of abuses, as in the case of a BOP corrections
officer who admitted to verbally abusing a Muslim inmate. Id. at 7.
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Constitution., 2 1 Indeed, the Supreme Court has insisted that "prisoners
be accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with
imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of
incarceration. '' 222  Among the rights that the Supreme Court has
acknowledged as retained by inmates are the Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, the Fifth Amendment
right to due process, the First Amendment right to reasonable
opportunities to practice their religion, and the right to petition the
government for redress of grievances.223 Federal courts are bound to
protect these constitutional rights against infringement by prison
224
regulations or practices.
Section 501.3(d) implicates additional rights, including the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and the Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure. Possible violations of inmates'
Fourth Amendment rights have received less attention and present a
more complicated problem, given the limited privacy rights retained by
prison inmates. But the right to confidential attorney-client
communications is sufficiently important to give inmates a justifiable
expectation of privacy in such communications, that is protected by the
Fourth Amendment.
A. The Fourth Amendment and Inmates' Right to Privacy in Their Cells
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized. "
This Amendment "safeguard[s] the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. 22 6  Central to
Fourth Amendment analysis is determining when a "search" or "seizure"
has occurred. The Supreme Court has relied upon the description in
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United States, which states that
for Fourth Amendment purposes, "a search occurs when the government
221. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). See also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
523 (1984) ("We have repeatedly held that prisons are not beyond the reach of the
Constitution.").
222. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523.
223. Id. at 523; Turner, 482 U.S. at 84.
224. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84.
225. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
226. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
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violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as
reasonable.,
227
Katz also clarified that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.228 Although the wording of the Fourth Amendment is chiefly
directed against intrusions into private homes, it is well established that it
also "shields private speech from unreasonable surveillance."
2 29
Consequently, determining whether a search or seizure violates this
constitutional provision requires more than determining whether a
certain place is a "constitutionally protected area."23  Instead, courts
must determine whether the search or seizure violated the target's
reasonable or justifiable expectation of privacy.3 Several courts have
therefore refused to hold that inmates lose all of their Fourth
Amendment rights simply because they are in prison, although their
status as inmates is highly relevant in assessing the reasonableness of
their expectation of privacy.
Obviously, inmates lose most of their privacy rights while imprisoned.
Thus it is clear that inmates are not entitled to the full panoply of Fourth
Amendment protections. The precise scope of their remaining Fourth
Amendment rights, on the other hand, is unclear. In Hudson v. Palmer,
the Supreme Court held that inmates retain no reasonable expectation of
privacy in their cells,23' and the government relies on this holding to
support its assertion that inmates retain no Fourth Amendment rights at
all.233 This assertion, however, greatly overstates the holding of Hudson
and fails to take into account the reasoning behind the holding or the
context in which it was decided. Furthermore, several courts have
recognized that inmates, particularly pre-trial detainees, retain some
residuum of privacy rights, even after Hudson.
Hudson involved the shakedown of an inmate's cell in a Virginia
• 2 3 4
prison. The inmate, Palmer, filed suit in federal district court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Hudson, an officer at the prison, had
conducted an unreasonable search of his locker and cell, and had brought
a false charge of destroying state property against him for the sole
227. Id. at 33 (citing United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.
concurring)). The Katz rule has been criticized as circular and unpredictable. Id. at 34.
228. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
229. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
230. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51.
231. See id. at 353.
232. 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984).
233. See Richard G. Schott, Warrantless Interception of Communications, 72 FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin 25, 28 (January 2003) (citing Hudson and stating that there is no
expectation of privacy in prisons).
234. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 519-20 (1984).
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purpose of harassment."' Palmer further alleged that Hudson
intentionally destroyed his property during the search, in violation of
236Palmer's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The district
court ruled for Hudson and the Fourth Circuit affirmed with respect to
the due process claim, holding that Palmer was not deprived of his
property without due process because an adequate post-deprivation state
211
remedy existed.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit also held that "a prisoner has a
'limited privacy right' in his cell entitling him to protection against
searches conducted solely to harass or to humiliate., 238 In order to
protect this right, "shakedown" searches of a cell should be conducted
only "'pursuant to an established program of conducting random
searches ... reasonably designed to deter or discover the possession of
contraband' or upon reasonable belief that the prisoner possesses
contraband., 239 The court remanded the case for a determination of the
purpose of the search at issue.240
Both parties appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine, in part, whether inmates are entitled to the Fourth
Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and seizures in
their cells. 41 The Supreme Court defined the inquiry as whether inmates
have a justifiable expectation of privacy that has been violated by
government action: "We must decide, in Justice Harlan's words, whether
a prisoner's expectation of privacy in his prison cell is the kind of
expectation that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable., 242 The
243Court answered this question in the negative.
The Court pointed out that inmates, by definition, are individuals who
have engaged in antisocial and often violent conduct, and have
demonstrated an inability to control or conform their behavior to societal
235. Id. at 520.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 520-21 (citing the holding in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), that a
negligent deprivation of inmate's property by state officials does not violate his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process if an adequate post-deprivation state remedy
exists and concluding that this holding should be extended to intentional deprivations of
property).
238. Id. at 521 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 697 F.2d 1220, 1225 (1983)).
239. Id at 522-23 (quoting the court of appeals' majority opinion).
240. Id. at 522.
241. Id. at 519. The Court also granted certiorari to determine whether Parratt's
holding regarding negligent deprivations of property should be extended to intentional
deprivations of property. Id.
242. Id. at 525 (quoting Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in United States v. Katz,
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)).
243. Id. at 525-26.
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expectations.244 Additionally, the Court cited statistics on violent crime
in the "volatile" state and federal prison systems and noted prison
administrators' responsibility to ensure the safety of the prison staff,
personnel, and visitors, in addition to the safety of the inmates
241themselves. In particular, prison administrators face the daunting task
of preventing drugs, weapons, and other contraband from entering or
circulating in the prisons, and detecting escape plots before they occur,
all while maintaining a sanitary environment.246 The Court concluded
that it would be "literally impossible" to maintain order and security if
inmates retained a right of privacy in their cells: "Virtually the only place
inmates can conceal weapons, drugs, and other contraband is in their
cells. Unfettered access to these cells by prison officials, thus, is
imperative if drugs and contraband are to be ferreted out and sanitary
surroundings are to be maintained.,
247
This need to maintain security in penal institutions was balanced
against the interests of inmates' privacy within their cells. The Court
struck the balance in favor of prison security, which it had consistently
identified as a central goal of correction systems.248  The Court was
confident that society would agree that loss of privacy is an inherent
consequence of incarceration and therefore, the Court concluded that
prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison
cells.249 Consequently, "the Fourth Amendment proscription against
unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison
cell.
,250
B. Inmate Privacy Rights After Hudson
While the holding in Hudson certainly reduced inmates' privacy rights,
it did not foreclose the recognition of a right to privacy with respect to
communications between inmates and their attorneys. Many courts have
read the holding as depriving inmates of only some of their Fourth
Amendment privacy rights T2 because the Hudson Court carefully
limited its discussion to the reasonable expectation of inmates in their
244. Id. at 526.
245. Id. at 526-27.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 527.
248. Id. (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974)).
249. Id. at 527-28.
250. Id. at 526.
251. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 796 F.2d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 1986).
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cells. 25 2 Moreover, the Court's conclusion that no privacy right existed in
prison cells was based upon prison officials' need for unfettered access to
the cells to search for contraband.21' The Court did not address inmates'
Fourth Amendment rights in relation to searches or seizures for purposes
unrelated to institutional security.
Several courts have held that Hudson does not apply to searches of
prison cells when the search is not related to prison security.254 In United
States v. Cohen,255 the Second Circuit was asked to decide whether prison
officials violated a pretrial detainee's Fourth Amendment rights when
they searched his cell without a warrant.21' Arthur Barr was arrested and
charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine in June 1984.257 Unable to
post bail, Barr was held in pretrial detention at the New York
Metropolitan Correctional Center.258 He was charged with distribution of
cocaine and interstate travel in aid of drug distribution, operating a
continuing criminal enterprise, tax evasion, obstruction of justice, and
259
witness tampering.
While Barr was incarcerated and awaiting trial, Assistant United States
Attorney Michael R. Bromwich instructed prison officials to conduct a
search of Barr's cell "to look for certain types of documents that may
have contained the names and phone numbers of other of Barr's co-
conspirators and witnesses who Barr had already contacted and was still
. .. trying to contact. ' '260 Acting on Bromwich's instruction, one of the
corrections officers conducted a "contraband" search of Barr's cell,
which consisted solely of an examination of Barr's papers.261 Based upon
information found during this search, the government obtained a search
warrant for Barr's cell authorizing the seizure of all of his written, non-
252. Id. at 530 (concluding that "prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy
and that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in
prison cells") (emphasis added).
253. Id. at 527. This holding is consistent with the test in Turner v. Safley, decided
three years after Hudson, in which the Court stated that prison regulations that impinge
on inmates' constitutional rights will be upheld if they are reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 796 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1986); State v. Henderson,
517 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1999) (concluding that "Hudson did not deprive pre-trial detainees of
all Fourth Amendment protections"); McCoy v. State, 639 S.2d 163 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
255. 796 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1986).
256. Id. at 20, 21.
257. Id. at 21.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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262legal materials. Pursuant to the warrant, the government seized papers
that it sought to use against Barr at his trial.2" Barr argued that the
initial, warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment, and moved to
have the resulting evidence suppressed.264 His motion was denied, and
Barr appealed.2 6
The government claimed that Hudson controlled and required
266affirmance of the district court's judgment. It argued that since neither
convicted inmates nor pretrial detainees have any right of privacy in their
cells, evidence obtained during a search of a prisoner's cell cannot be
suppressed on constitutional grounds.2 7 The Second Circuit rejected this
argument; instead, it concluded that Hudson should not be read to hold
that pre-trial detainees retain no Fourth Amendment rights regardless of
the circumstances underlying the search.266
The court gave several reasons for its conclusion. First, the search was
initiated at the request of the prosecution, with the hope of finding
incriminating evidence, and not by prison officials motivated by safety
concerns. 269 The Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court did not
have this situation in mind when deciding Hudson,270 which emphasized
the need to balance individual rights against "legitimate penological
objectives."27'
While acknowledging prison officials' need for discretion to take
measures to ensure prison security, the court declined to extend that
272discretion to prosecutors. Because the purpose of the prosecution's
search was solely to obtain information for another indictment, the court
that the type of search was outside of the scope of Hudson.2 73 The court
262. Id.
263. Id. at 21, 23.
264. Id. at 21.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 22.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 23.
269. Id. (noting that the decision was not made by those officials in the best position to
evaluate security needs, "nor was the search even colorably motivated by institutional
safety concerns").
270. Id. The court explained:
The Supreme Court in Hudson did not contemplate a cell search intended solely
to bolster the prosecution's case against a pre-trial detainee awaiting his day in
court; it did not have before it the issue of whether such a search could lawfully
be used by government prosecutors to uncover information that would aid them
in laying additional indictments against a detainee.
Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 23-24.
273. Id. at 24.
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held that Barr retained an expectation of privacy in his cell sufficient to
challenge the warrantless search requested by the prosecution on Fourth
Amendment grounds.
Courts have also recognized that prisoners "retain a limited
constitutional right to bodily privacy, particularly as to searches viewed
or conducted by members of the opposite sex., 275 In Hayes, the Tenth
Circuit held that summary judgment in favor of prison administrators
was inappropriate in a case in which an inmate alleged that he had been
subjected to a videotaped body cavity search in front of more than one
hundred people, including female administrative staff.276 "Although the
Fourth Amendment does not require the complete exclusion of members
of the opposite sex from areas in which searches are conducted ... and
although the security concerns articulated by prison officials are entitled
to great deference," the court found that the prison administrator's
statement regarding the incident was not sufficient to establish as a
matter of law that the search was reasonable.277 The court remanded for
278further proceedings on the inmate's Fourth Amendment claim. In sum,
"An individual's mere presence in a prison cell does not totally strip
away every garment cloaking his Fourth Amendment rights, even though
the covering that remains is but a small remnant., 279 That remnant is
large enough to cover a right to private attorney-inmate communications.
C. Recognizing a Fourth Amendment Right to Private Inmate-Attorney
Communications.
Under the test set out in Hudson, a Fourth Amendment right to
privacy must be established before determining the constitutional
validity of a regulation.2 0  The proper inquiry is whether society is
prepared to recognize a prisoner's expectation of privacy as reasonable
274. Id. The Second Circuit recently clarified that the holding in Cohen is limited to
searches of pre-trial inmates and it refused to recognize a Fourth Amendment privacy
right for convicted prisoners. Willis v. Artuz, 301 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2002).
275. Hayes v. Marriott, 70 F.3d 1144, 1146 (10th Cir. 1995). See generally Mary Ann
Farkas & Kathryn R. L. Rand, Female Correctional Officers and Prisoner Privacy, 80
MARQ. L. REV. 995 (1997); Tracy McMath, Do Prison Inmates Retain Any Fourth
Amendment Protection From Body Cavity Searches?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 739 (1987); David
J. Stollman, Jordan v. Gardner: Female Prisoners' Rights to be Free from Random, Cross-
Gender Clothed Body Searches, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877 (1994).
276. Hayes, 70 F.3d at 1147-48.
277. Id. at 1148. But see Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1006 (1996) (stating that prisoners retain no Fourth Amendment right of privacy
while being monitored by guards while naked).
278. Hayes, 70 F.3d at 1148-49.
279. Cohen, 796 F.2d at 24.
280. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 522 (1984).
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when communicating with his or her attorney. Because inmates have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their communications with their
attorneys, and because society is prepared to recognize that expectation
as reasonable, the Fourth Amendment protects the communications
from unreasonable searches and seizures.' 2
Although the question has not come before the Supreme Court, many
state and lower federal courts have held that the right to privacy of
communications is essential to the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Many state regulations regarding inmate telephone calls, mail,
or visits exempt communications with attorneys from the scope of
284
authorized monitoring. Moreover, under BOP regulations, prison
officials may inspect and read all correspondence, unless it is labeled
"special mail" (which includes attorney-client communications); 285
281. Seeid. at 524-25.
282. Contra id. at 525-26.
283. See supra note 99.
284. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.231(c) (2002) ("A telephone call between an
attorney and a prisoner... may not be monitored or recorded except when authorized by
a court."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 636(a) (1999) ("Every person who, without permission...
eavesdrops on or records ... a conversation ... between a person who is in the physical
custody of a[n] ... officer, or who is on the property of a law enforcement agency or other
public agency, and that person's attorney.., is guilty of a felony."); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-3-403 (2002) ("Any person committed, imprisoned, or arrested.., whether or not...
charged with an offense [can] consult with an attorney.., whom such person desires to see
or consult, alone and in private at the place of custody, as many times and for such period
each time as is reasonable."); CONN. AGENCIES REG. §§ 18-81-28, 18-81-46 (2003)
(mandating that inmates be provided reasonable accommodation to make telephone calls
to attorneys and that such calls not be recorded or listened to by prison staff); MASS.
REGS. CODE TIT. 103, § 482.07(3)(d) (2000) ("All inmate telephone calls, except calls to
pre-authorized attorney telephone numbers are subject to telephone monitoring."); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.270(1)(a) (1998 & Supp. 2003) (permitting the director of
correctional facilities to create rules under which telephone calls may be monitored but
stating that the rules "shall prescribe a procedure by which a prisoner may make
telephone calls to his or her attorney ... that are not monitored"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
481.10 (2002) (requiring "officers or persons having in their custody a person restrained of
liberty" to allow any attorney retained by or on behalf of the person restrained to conduct
a private interview at the place of custody, and to provide private telephone access to such
representation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.20 (2002) ("After the arrest, detention, or
... other taking into custody of a person ... such person shall be permitted.., facilities to
communicate with an attorney ... of his choice .... Such person shall have a right to be
visited immediately by any attorney at law so obtained . . . and to consult with him
privately."); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-20-5e(6) (2003) ("To safeguard the sanctity of the
attorney-client privilege, an adequate number of telephone lines that are not monitored
shall be made available for telephone calls between inmates and their attorneys. Such
calls shall not be monitored, intercepted, recorded, or disclosed in any matter."); WIS.
ADMIN. CODE § DOC 309.04 (2001) (prohibiting department of corrections staff from
opening or reading mail sent by an inmate to an attorney; mail received by an inmate from
an attorney may only be opened by staff in the presence of the inmate).
285. 28 C.F.R. § 540.2(c) (2002).
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"special mail" may only be opened and inspected for contraband in the
presence of the inmate to or from whom it is sent. 2 6 Attorney-inmate
conversations are also exempt from the routine monitoring of prisoners'
telephone calls. Visits by attorneys must take place in an area that
allows a "degree of privacy., 28 8 Finally, "[sitaff may not subject visits
between an attorney and an inmate to auditory supervision.
289
While the right to confidential attorney-inmate communications is
usually associated with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the
Fourth Amendment right to privacy also merits consideration. First, the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel only attaches upon the initiation of a
criminal prosecution. Consequently, material witnesses, persons arrested
but not formally charged, inmates whose convictions are final and whose
appeals are exhausted, and other detainees who have no Sixth
Amendment right but who are subject to monitoring under the expansive
definition of "inmate" under § 501.3(d), would not be able to challenge
290the regulation on Sixth Amendment grounds. Yet these persons may
have as much-or greater-need to communicate in confidence with
their attorneys.
The sensitive nature of the communication also makes recognition of a
privacy right reasonable. Inmates have a strong interest in obtaining
candid legal advice, not only regarding the circumstances that led to their
imprisonment, but also respecting to personal issues that may arise while
they are incarcerated;2 9 1 they must feel free to discuss potentially
292
embarrassing or even incriminating facts. While the nature of
286. § 540.18(a). The regulation provides:
[T]he Warden shall open incoming special mail only in the presence of the
inmate for inspection for physical contraband and the qualification of any
enclosures as special mail. The correspondence may not be read or copied if the
sender is adequately identified on the envelope, and the front of the envelope is
marked "Special Mail -Open only in the presence of the inmate."
Id. Additionally, "except as provided for in paragraph (c)(2) of this section [detailing
screening procedures for mail sent by an inmate who the Warden has determined poses a
threat to the recipient] outgoing special mail may be sealed by the inmate and is not
subject to inspection." § 540.18(c)(1).
287. See 28 C.F.R. § 540.102 (2002) (providing that "staff may not monitor an inmate's
properly placed call to an attorney. The Warden shall notify an inmate of the proper
procedures to have an unmonitored telephone conversation with an attorney").
288. § 543.13(b).
289. § 543.13(e).
290. See § 500.1(c); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-68 (2001) (noting that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not attach until after the initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings, whether by formal charge, indictment, information, or arraignment).
291. For instance, an inmate may need advice regarding a divorce, attempts to
terminate parental rights, real estate transactions, or immigration issues.
292. See Cohn, supra note 45, at 1254-55.
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information or activities that an individual seeks to protect is not decisive
in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, the
Supreme Court has indicated that it may be a factor.2 93  The largely
uniform case law and state and federal regulations exempting attorney-
client communications from monitoring reflects recognition of the special
and significant nature of these communications and the importance of
confidentiality. 94 This widespread acceptance of the confidentiality of
such communications demonstrates that society has long recognized the
right to private attorney-inmate communications as reasonable.
Society might find the right of privacy unreasonable in the wake of
recent terrorist attacks if the government demonstrated that recognizing
the right presented a threat to national security. However, as discussed
above, confidential communications between inmates and attorneys pose
no greater risk than communications of suspected terrorists outside of
the prison context. Both the Supreme Court and Congress have
concluded that the threat to national security does not justify abandoning
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 295  Moreover, the
government has not articulated any reason why obtaining a warrant
before conducting the monitoring would hinder the effort to deter
inmates from using attorney-client communications to further terrorist
plans. 296 Because the recognition of this right does not unduly burden the
government, or pose a threat to national security, society will likely
continue to recognize inmates' expectation of privacy in this context as
reasonable. Consequently, the Fourth Amendment proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures should apply to communications
between inmates and their attorneys.297
293. Compare Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 4520-52 (1989) (holding that defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy from a helicopter legally hovering over his
curtilage), with Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235-36 (1986). The Dow
Chemical Court explained that the curtilage of a home receives special protection because
intimate activities associated with home and the "privacies of life" take place in that area.
Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)).
294. It may also reflect the fact that many courts have held that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel requires recognition of a right to private communication with attorneys.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
295. See discussion supra Part III.E.
296. See discussion supra Part III.E.
297. Congress may, of course, choose to set standards for issuing warrants in a context
that differs from those set out in Title III. See Unites States v. United States Dist. Court
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972). See also discussion supra Part III.B.
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V. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) VIOLATES INMATES' FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS
Recognizing a Fourth Amendment right to privacy does not
automatically invalidate the monitoring regulation. The loss or
curtailment of some constitutional rights is necessary to accommodate
institutional security needs.9 To that end, even regulations that violate
inmates' constitutional rights will be upheld if the regulations are
necessary to promote valid penological objectives. 299 Recognizing that
prison administration is an "inordinately difficult" task that has been
delegated to the legislative and executive branches, the Supreme Court
has adopted a policy of judicial restraint and deference to prison
administrators when reviewing prison regulations."" This policy applies
equally to convicted inmates and pretrial detainees."'
Given the tension between inmates' constitutional rights and the
institutional needs of prison facilities (including the paramount goal of
internal security), courts struggled to find a standard of review for prison
regulations that struck the appropriate balance. In Procunier v.
Martinez the Supreme Court reviewed mail censorship regulations.3 3
The Court held that the regulations should be upheld if they furthered an
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression, and if the constitutional infringement was no
greater than necessary to protect that interest.3°' After Martinez, the
Supreme Court decided Pell v. Procunier0 5 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners'
298. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984). Internal security is only one of the
objectives of restrictions on inmate rights. In addition, "[t]hese restrictions ... also serve,
incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of justice, deterrence and retribution are
factors in addition to correction." Id.
299. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
300. Id. at 84-85.
301. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (stating, in general, "[a] [pretrial]
detainee simply does not possess the full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated
individual."). Id. The Court noted:
There is no basis for concluding that pretrial detainees pose any lesser security
risk than convicted inmates. Indeed, it may be that in certain circumstances they
present a greater risk to jail security and order. In the federal system, a detainee
is committed to the detention facility only because no other less drastic means
can reasonably assure his presence at trial. As a result, those who are detained
prior to trial may in many cases be individuals who are charged with serious
crimes or who have prior records.
Id. at 546 & n.28 (internal citations omitted).
302. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
303. Id. at 398-99.
304. Id. at 413.
305. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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Labor Union, Inc.,31 6 Bell v. Wolfish,"" and Block v. Rutherford.3 "8 In
each of these cases, the Supreme Court abandoned the standard used in
Martinez and instead inquired whether the challenged prison regulations
were reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives. In Turner
v. Safley, 3119 the Court resolved the confusion regarding the standard of
review in prison regulation cases: "If Pell, Jones, and Bell have not
already resolved the question posed in Martinez, we resolve it now: when
a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests." 31"
The Supreme Court then set out the factors that courts should consider
when evaluating the reasonableness of a particular regulation: (1) there
must be a rational relationship between the regulation and the
penological interest; (2) the court must consider whether there are
alternative means of exercising the right that are available to inmates; (3)
it must consider the impact that accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right would have on prison officials, other inmates, and
prison resources; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives is to be
regarded as evidence of the reasonableness of the regulation (while the
existence of obvious, easy alternatives may provide evidence of the
regulation's unreasonableness). 31   Thus, challenging the monitoring
regulation on Fourth Amendment grounds is a two-step process. The
regulation must be shown to violate an inmate's Fourth Amendment
rights. Even if this burden is met, the court must then determine whether
that regulation is nevertheless reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest. If it is, it will be sustained. Otherwise, it must be
struck down.312
A. Warrantless Monitoring Authorized by § 501.3(d) Violates Inmates'
Fourth Amendment Rights.
One can argue that, although the Fourth Amendment protects
inmates' justifiable expectation of privacy in their communications with
their attorneys, the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant
before monitoring can occur. Indeed, the pre-Hudson cases accepted
306. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
307. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
308. 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
309. 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
310. Id. at 89.
311. Id. at 89-91. See also Overton v. Bazzetta, 123 S. Ct. 2162, 2167-70 (2003)
(applying the Turner standard of review and analyzing the four Turner factors to prison
regulation that restricted visitation by children).
312. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
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this argument in the case of cell searches, and concluded that searches11 34
merely had to be reasonable. In Keith, the Supreme Court held that
the Executive was bound by the Fourth Amendment when conducting
national security surveillance of domestic targets, but noted exceptions to
•315
the warrant requirement. The monitoring regulation, however, does
not fall into any of those "carefully delineated exceptions.
'3 16
Departure from the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in the
• J" 1 311
present situation is not justified. While the need for prison security
may make warrantless searches of prison cells reasonable, no comparable
concerns are raised by confidential inmate-attorney communications.
And, as the Supreme Court explained in Keith, national security
concerns do not automatically justify dispensing with the warrant
318
requirement.
313. See, e.g., United States v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1982) ("We expressly
reject appellant's contention that ... a warrant was required."); United States v. Lilly, 576
F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The government needs neither a warrant nor probable
cause to conduct a search or seizure in the prison context because of prisoners' decreased
expectations of privacy and because of the exigencies inherent in the prison
environment."); United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831, 832 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting that
obviation of the warrant requirement in prisons rests in part on diminished expectations of
privacy).
314. See, e.g., Chamorro, 687 F.2d at 4-5; Lilly, 576 F.2d at 1244-45; Stumes, 549 F.2d at
832.
315. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 318-21 (1972).
316. Id. at 318 (noting that the exceptions to the warrant requirement generally "serve
to the legitimate needs of law enforcement officers to protect their own well-being and
preserve evidence from destruction"). Section 501.3(d) is not designed to protect law
enforcement offices or preserve evidence. Nor does the regulation fall into the category of
"special needs" exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Supreme Court has
recognized that "in limited circumstances a search unsupported by either warrant or
probable cause can be constitutional when 'special needs' other than the normal need for
law enforcement provide sufficient justification." Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S.
67, 76 n.1 (2001) (emphasis added). The Court has approved "special needs" searches
when the privacy interests at issue are minimal and exceptional circumstances make the
probable cause and warrant requirement impracticable. Id. at 76, 78; Skinner v. Railway
Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989). Section 501.3(d) implicates significant
privacy interests and serves a general law enforcement purpose. Moreover, obtaining a
warrant for monitoring is not impracticable. For these reasons, 501.3(d) does not meet the
criteria for the special needs exception to the warrant requirement. See Ferguson, 532
U.S. at 78, 81 (refusing to apply special needs exception when the invasion of privacy was
substantial and law enforcement was a central purpose of the searches at issue).
317. See supra Part III.B.
318. Keith, 407 U.S. at 320. See also supra Part III.B. The Court's holding in Keith
was limited to domestic threats to national security, but the same arguments could apply
to foreign threats. National security concerns may, however, justify procedures for issuing
a warrant for prison monitoring that vary from those set out in Title III, FED. R. CRIM. P.
41, or FISA. The Keith Court acknowledged that security surveillance may involve
different policy and practical considerations than those involved in surveillance of other
"ordinary crimes." Keith, 407 U.S. at 322-23. Those considerations may justify different
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On the other hand, prior judicial approval and ongoing judicial review
are necesary to ensure against violations of the attorney-client privilege.
Once an inmate recveives notification that all communications with his
or her attorney may be monitored, the inmate has no means of
challenging the decision.1 9 For this reason, merely giving notice that
monitoring will occur does not make the search and seizure reasonable.
Knowing that your rights are being violated is of no comfort if you are
without the means to end or even challenge the violation.
Moreover, while the regulation refers to procedures designed to
safeguard the privilege, the BOP Director retains discretion over the
precise procedures to be implemented. 30 Neither the inmate nor his or
her attorney has a right under the regulation to know what procedures321
are being employed or to challenge the sufficiency of the procedures.
Furthermore, even if the procedures are acceptable, without judicial
oversight an inmate or attorney cannot know whether the prison officials
are following procedures. Finally, the federal officers involved in the
monitoring make the final decision as to whether a communication is
privileged.322 Making such a determination is likely to be a complex
matter, particularly if the government suspects that the inmate is
speaking in code or passing hidden messages in otherwise innocuous
conversations.
Weighed against the substantial intrusion upon inmates' rights, the
warrant requirement is a minor hurdle for the Attorney General. Given
the highly sensitive nature of the communications, and the inherent
problems noted above in having all decisions made by the Executive
Branch, requiring federal officials to obtain a warrant before monitoring
attorney-inmate communications is necessary to make any search or
seizure of attorney-inmate communications reasonable. Because §
501.3(d) does not require a warrant or allow for any judicial involvement
or review, it violates the Fourth Amendment.
warrant standards, so long as the standards are reasonable. Id. at 322-24. A key feature of
any reasonable procedure must be prior judicial review.
319. The Attorney General's determination that the "reasonable suspicion" standard
has been met is final. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2002).
320. § 501.3(d)(3). This section states:
The Director, Bureau of Prisons, with the approval of the Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division, shall employ appropriate procedures to
ensure that all attorney-client communications are reviewed for privilege claims
and that any properly privileged materials (including, but not limited to,
recordings of privileged conversations) are not retained during the course of the
monitoring.
Id. (emphasis added).
321. See id.
322. Id.
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B. Applying the Turner Factors
Generally, even a prison regulation that impinges on a prisoner's
constitutional rights is still valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest.323 An examination of § 501.3(d) in light of the four
Turner factors makes it clear that the regulation is unreasonable and
invalid.
1. Valid, Rational Connection
A prison regulation cannot stand if "the logical connection between
the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy
arbitrary or irrational., 324 Deterring future acts of terrorism is not a
penological objective. Thus, to the extent that a penological objective is
required-typically related to institutional security-this factor weighs
325
against upholding the regulation. Because it does not contain a
penoloical objective, the regulation should not be upheld.
However, the test is often phrased as requiring a rational connection
between the prison regulation and a legitimate governmental interest.326
Deterrence of crime is certainly a legitimate governmental interest.
Although doubtful that monitoring every conversation between a
prisoner and his or her attorney would effectively deter the most
determined terrorist from passing coded messages, a rational connection
between the regulation and the goal of deterrence probably exists. If
rational relation to a governmental interest is sufficient to satisfy this
factor, then it will weigh in favor of upholding the regulation.
2. Alternative Means
If inmates have other means of exercising the asserted right-here, the
right to communicate privately with attorneys-then judicial deference
321
to the rule-making of prison officials is appropriate. Obviously,
323. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (noting that in Turner, the Court
adopted "a unitary, deferential standard for reviewing prisoner constitutional claims:
'[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."') (quoting Turner, 482
U.S. at 89).
324. Id. at 89-90. See also Shaw, 532 U.S. at 229-230. Specifically, the regulation itself
states that communications will be monitored "for the purpose of deterring future acts
that could result in death or serious bodily injury to persons, or substantial damage to
property that would entail the risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons." Id. The
Court determined that "[i]f the connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is
'arbitrary or irrational,' then the regulation fails, irrespective of whether the other factors
tilt in its favor." Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).
325. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2002).
326. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
327. Id.
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inmates have very limited avenues of communicating with anyone
outside of the prison, including their attorneys. Moreover, on its face,
the regulation applies to any attorney with whom the prisoner
communicates.328 Section 501.3(d) also allows the government to monitor
every available means of communication,329 leaving inmates with no
means of communicating privately with legal counsel, even though
confidential communication is an essential component of a prisoner's
right to effective assistance of counsel.330 Thus, this factor clearly weighs
against upholding § 501.3(d).
3. Impact of Exercised Right
Courts are sensitive to the fact that the exercise of certain rights within
the closed prison environment may have a "ripple effect" on other
inmates and staff.31'  However, accommodating inmates' right to
confidential communications with their attorneys will have little, if any,
impact on the prison environment. Current regulations-aside from
§ 501.3(d)-protect the confidentiality of such communications, and
prison officials should already have procedures in place to protect the
confidentiality of communications while simultaneously ensuring internal
security.332 These security procedures will remain in place even if §
501.3(d) is upheld because the vast majority of inmates will not be
subject to monitoring.
While the inmates who are identified as potential threats (as defined in
§ 501.3(d)) may pose a higher risk to prison security in general,
warrantless monitoring of their communications with their attorneys is
not likely to significantly reduce the internal threat. Moreover, assuming
a warrant is obtained, the monitoring can still take place. Therefore,
allowing those inmates to exercise their right to confidential
communication with counsel does not result in significantly less liberty or
safety for others in the prison.
4. Alternatives
The existence of obvious, easy alternatives for achieving the same
objective is strong evidence that the regulation is unreasonable.333 While
328. See § 501.3(d).
329. See id.
330. See supra note 99.
331. Id.
332. See §§ 543.13(b), 543.13(e), 540.18(a), 540.18(c)(1), 540.102 (addressing
respectively, the time and place of attorneys' visits, permissible recordings of attorneys'
visits, opening special mail, sealing special mail, and the monitoring of inmate phone
calls).
333. Id.
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prison officials are not obligated to find the least restrictive means of
accommodating inmates' constitutional rights, a court may find that the
regulation does not meet the reasonable relationship standard if an
alternative exists that fully accommodates those rights at minimal cost to
valid penological interests.334
Section 501.3(d) represents an exaggerated and unreasonable response
to the government's concerns. Title III, FED. R. CRIM. P. 41, and FISA
are easy, obvious alternatives that are available at minimal cost to
penological interests. Requiring the Executive branch to seek a warrant
before monitoring communications between inmates and attorneys does
not impose any greater burden on prison officials, and only imposes a
minimal burden on the Attorney General.3  This final factor, then, also
weighs against upholding § 501.3(d).336
VI. CONCLUSION
Weighing the four relevant factors, clearly the monitoring regulation
does not pass constitutional muster and should be struck down. In a time
of increasing suspicion and fear, it is the responsibility of the executive
branch to instill confidence in our system of government, including the
legislative and judicial branches. By choosing to ignore statutes enacted
by Congress for conducting surveillance and bypassing prior judicial
review, the Attorney General instead breeds distrust.
Section 501.3(d) is also unnecessary and unconstitutional. Existing
statutes and rules allow the Attorney General to monitor inmate-
attorney communications after obtaining a warrant.337 Dispensing with
the warrant requirement, as § 501.3(d) purports to do, violates the right
to confidential communications between the inmates and their
attorneys-a right that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable and
which therefore, receives protection under the Fourth Amendment. For
these reasons, the regulation should be struck down.
334. Id. at 90-91.
335. See supra Part II.D.
336. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 97-98 (striking down regulation prohibiting inmates from
marrying without the permission of the superintendent of the prison because, among other
reasons, it was an exaggerated response to the stated security goal, and obvious, easy
alternatives existed that would "accommodate the right to marry while imposing a de
minimis burden on the pursuit of security objectives").
337. See supra Part II.
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